Anticipatory concern: a study in autism

Hobson, Jessica A.; Harris, R J; García-Pérez, Rosa M.; Hobson, R. Peter

doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00762.x

Cited by 60 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…For this purpose, we adapted and modified a task developed by Hobson, Harris, García-Pérez, and Hobson (2009). In our study, 18-month-old and 2-yearold children first viewed an adult either harming another adult by destroying or taking away her possessions (harm condition) or else doing something similar that did not harm her (neutral condition).…”

Section: Distressing Situations In the Absence Of Distress Cuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the absence of emotional cues, one way to make this inference is via simulation, which involves imagining oneself in another's situation (e.g., Decety & Sommerville, 2003;Harris, 1995). An alternative but related possibility is that the observer can feel her way into the experience of and feel for the other person because she identifies with that person's attitudes (Hobson et al, 2009). In either case, one eventually takes the other's perspective and apprehends the other's affective state, which can activate affective responses such as sympathy and can thereby motivate prosocial behavior (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987;Feshbach, 1978;Krebs & Russell, 1981).…”

Section: Distressing Situations In the Absence Of Distress Cuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social-Cognitive Contributors to Young Children’s Empathic and Prosocial behavior

Vaish

Warneken

2011

Empathy

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Section: Distressing Situations In the Absence Of Distress Cuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Distressing Situations In the Absence Of Distress Cuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social-Cognitive Contributors to Young Children’s Empathic and Prosocial behavior

Vaish

Warneken

2011

Empathy

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“…To point to a place on one's own body to pick out the corresponding place on that of the other, is to treat her as somebody like oneself rather than as an object. Autistic children also engage much less in the kind of affirmative nodding people often show when listening to others (Hobson et al 2009). A straightforward interpretation of this is that they experience common ground less and/or have less interest in emphasizing it and in maintaining the emotional connection that it brings with it.…”

Section: A Mode Account Of Human Cooperative Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A History of Emerging Modes?

Schmitz

2016

Journal of Social Ontology

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Abstract:In this paper I first introduce Tomasello's notion of thought and his account of its emergence and development through differentiation, arguing that it calls into question the theory bias of the philosophical tradition on thought as well as its frequent atomism. I then raise some worries that he may be overextending the concept of thought, arguing that we should recognize an area of intentionality intermediate between action and perception on the one hand and thought on the other. After that I argue that the co-operative nature of humans is reflected in the very structure of their intentionality and thought: in co-operative modes such as the mode of joint attention and action and the we-mode, they experience and represent others as co-subjects of joint relations to situations in the world rather than as mere objects. In conclusion, I briefly comment on what Tomasello refers to as one of two big open questions in the theory of collective intentionality, namely that of the irreducibility of jointness.

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“…Autistic children further engage much less in the kind of affirmative nodding people often display when listening to others, and only 3 of 16 children with autism showed a concerned look when the drawing of the tester was torn in a joint attention situation (J. Hobson et al 2009), revealing that autism is also connected to deficits in experiencing the world with the other's eyes, with regard to their interests and concerns.…”

Section: From the Present Perspective What Is Most Important About Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is a Mode Account of Collective Intentionality?

Schmitz

2016

Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality

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Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses; Springer 2017, pp. 37-70; please refer to the published version.) Mode vs. content and subject approaches to collective intentionalityMany attempts to understand collective intentionality have tried to steer between two extremes.We want to understand how the members of a group are bound together, what turns them into a group, so we don't want to think of the group as a mere sum of individuals. At the same time, we don't want the group to be free-floating with regard to the members. It should not come out as just another individual, as an additional person as it were, nor should it be emergent in a radical sense. It's useful to distinguish attempts to accomplish this balancing act in terms of where they solely or predominantly locate collectivity: in the content of relevant intentional states (or speech acts), in their mode, or in their subject(s) (Schweikard and Schmid 2012). A content approach tries to understand collectivity in terms of the contents of the subjects' intentionality, where content is understood in the standard fashion, namely as what the subjects believe, intend, hope, feel, and so on. So on this kind of view, collectivity is just a matter of certain kinds of things that individuals believe, intend, and feel with regard to each other. On this perspective, the bestknown representative of which is Michael Bratman (1992;, there may be a 'we' of joint action as represented in the content of intentions, but these intentions are always of the form 'I intend that we J', so that no collective 'we'-subject of intentional states is represented.1 Now, this kind of approach is in danger of erring on the side of being too individualistic. Can we reallyWhat is a mode account of collective intentionality?/Schmitz 2 reduce all our practical and theoretical we-thoughts to I-thoughts? Does it make sense to suppose that an individual subject intends a collective action? On the other side of the spectrum, we find those who unabashedly embrace the notion of collective, plural subjects (Gilbert 1992;Schmid 2009) and thus, many will feel, put themselves in danger of erring on the side of being too collectivistic. What can it mean that there is an additional subject here? Do we really have to commit to such an entity just in order to explain joint action?It is easy to sympathize with attempts that try to find a middle ground between these approaches. A clear statement of such an alternative is provided by John Searle (1995;2010).Searle holds that we-intentionality is conceptually irreducible to I-intentionality, but that this form of intentionality can be entirely located in the minds (and heads) of individuals, and that these individuals -and only these individuals -are the logical subjects of this intentionality. SoSearle rejects both conceptual reduction as well as ontologically irreducible collective subjects.His attitude could be summed up in the slogan "Conceptual reduction no, ontological reduction yes!...

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Anticipatory concern: a study in autism

Cited by 60 publications

References 74 publications

Social-Cognitive Contributors to Young Children’s Empathic and Prosocial behavior

Social-Cognitive Contributors to Young Children’s Empathic and Prosocial behavior

A History of Emerging Modes?

What is a Mode Account of Collective Intentionality?

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