Anticorruption in Transition 3

Anderson, James H.; Gray, Cheryl W.

doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-6692-9

Cited by 67 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…Studying the intensity of anticorruption policy measures in the postcommunist world, Steves and Rousso (2003) find that in the period from 1999 to 2002, when most of the new civil service laws were adopted, bribery and kickbacks in the administrations decreased. Using 2005 data from the World Bank, Anderson and Gray (2006) also conclude that the introduction of institutional change, including reinforcing meritocracy in the civil service, helped reduce corruption in a relatively short time. That civil service reform might have had an early impact on bureaucrats’ behavior is indicated by evidence of improved administrative professionalization.…”

Section: Toward Testable Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Effectiveness of Administrative Reform in New Democracies

Neshkova

Kostadinova

2012

Public Administration Review

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Practitioners and scholars of postcommunist politics disagree on the accomplishments of administrative reforms in new Eastern European democracies. The transformation of the public sector after 1989 has aimed to consolidate the democratic process and enhance economic development. Skeptics, however, argue that administrative reforms face serious challenges in the context of economic liberalization, insufficient capacity for modernization, and cultural legacies of the past. The authors judge reform effectiveness by testing the impact of civil service reform on government transparency and foreign direct investment. The results of the empirical analysis confirm that once reform is adopted, administrations become more effective at reducing corruption and attracting investment. Despite the delays and difficulties of implementation, the adoption of reform is important in and of itself, and countries can expect positive results sooner than skeptics predict.

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Section: Toward Testable Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Effectiveness of Administrative Reform in New Democracies

Neshkova

Kostadinova

2012

Public Administration Review

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“…Scholars have noted that the privatization entailed considerable corruption (e.g. Anderson and Gray, 2006;Hellman et al, 2003;Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1996), 23 and it is plausible that early incumbents, to the extent that they were rent-seeking, had considerable scope for learning how best to extract remts (e.g. Shleifer and Treisman, 2001).…”

Section: Increasing Rentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Increasing rents and incumbency disadvantage

Klašnja

2015

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Recent empirical studies have found a incumbency disadvantage in many developing democracies, in marked contrast with the well-known incumbency advantage in the US and other developed democracies. We know considerably less about incumbency disadvantage than incumbency advantage. In a simple principal-agent framework, I explore the role of a prominent feature of developing democracies -corruption. When rents are constant in incumbents' tenure -a standard assumption -the conditions for incumbency disadvantage are existent but limited; however, increasing rents, possibly due to learning, a gradual build-up of rent-extraction networks or fiscal windfalls, considerably increase the possibility of incumbency disadvantage, because voters may prefer inexperienced and unconnected challengers, even if they are of lower quality. Incumbency disadvantage becomes more likely as the pace of rent increase grows, politician quality decreases, with noise in the policy outcome, and potentially even when the pool of politicians improves. It is strictly more costly than any electoral outcome with high but constant-rents. The results highlight a novel reason for control of corruption and sensitivity to its dynamics.

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“…The World Bank's 'Doing Business-2006' Survey ranked Ukraine 124th of the 155 countries rated in terms of positive business climate, arguing that (2005) survey, meanwhile, states that in Ukraine, 82 percent of respondents had recently paid a bribe to access services/goods to which they were entitled, the highest figure in the world. Although Anderson and Gray (2006) argue that the level of corruption is decreasing they acknowledge there is still much work to be done. It is perhaps little surprise, therefore, to find that when proxy indicators are used to measure the magnitude of informal employment, it has been estimated to be equivalent to 47.3Á/53.7 percent of GDP using physical input proxies (Schneider and Enste 2000) and 55Á/70 percent using currency demand (Dzvinka 2002).…”

Section: Setting the Scenementioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Hierarchical Representations of the Formal/Informal Employment Dualism

Williams

Round

2009

European Societies

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This paper evaluates critically the conventional hierarchical representation of the formal/informal employment dualism, which depicts formal employment as extensive and positively contributing to economic development and social cohesion, and the separate realm of informal employment as weaker, inhabiting the margins and impairing progress and development. Although the discourses of informal employment as weak, marginal and separate from formal employment have been previously put under the spotlight, there has been little questioning of whether informal employment is a negative phenomenon. Through a study of Ukraine, however, this paper finds evidence that informal employment positively contributes to not only economic development as a seedbed for enterprise and entrepreneurship but also social cohesion as a primary vehicle for delivering community self-help. The outcome is a call for a finer-grained understanding of informal (and ultimately also formal) employment that recognises its plurality of forms and their varying consequences for economic development and social cohesion.

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Anticorruption in Transition 3

Cited by 67 publications

References 0 publications

The Effectiveness of Administrative Reform in New Democracies

The Effectiveness of Administrative Reform in New Democracies

Increasing rents and incumbency disadvantage

Beyond Hierarchical Representations of the Formal/Informal Employment Dualism

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