Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies? Modeling the EU-China Solar Panel Dispute

Bougette, Patrice; Charlier, Christophe

doi:10.5547/01956574.39.6.pbou

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…The emergence of TTBs as the new form of protectionism is one of the most remarkable changes in the international trade system during the past decades [5][6][7][8][9]42]. The trend of employing TTBs as effective remedy actions against imports has become exceedingly popular [43,44].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Temporary Trade Barriers in Global Forest Products Industry

et al. 2020

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Imposing temporary trade barriers (TTBs) as remedy actions against imports has become popular among global countries in recent decades. Many countries have employed these trade barriers to protect domestic firms from possible injury by unfair international trade. This study evaluated the main factors that influenced the implementation of TTBs in the forest products industry from 1995 to 2015 for two scenarios: a global and developing countries scenario; and a paper and non-paper products scenario. A two-step sample selection model was employed to assess the determinants of the decision to impose TTBs and the frequency to implement TTBs for the scenario of global and developing countries. From the perspective of forest products, determinants of applying TTBs on paper and non-paper products were examined with the probit regression. For the scenario of global and developing countries, the import, employment in agriculture, forest coverage rate, inflation, and GDP per capita were significant determinants. For the scenario of paper and non-paper products, variables of the forest area, imports, exports, GDP per capita, tariff rate, expenditure on education, and employment in agriculture were significant. The results show that a country with a large per capita GDP is more likely to file more TTBs against others. One implication is that countries should be cautious to impose TTBs, as it may cause the attention to shift from the inefficiencies of domestic forest firms to the unfair trade actions of exporters.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Temporary Trade Barriers in Global Forest Products Industry

et al. 2020

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“…During the process, promoting policies, for example, FiT and RPS, have been key to the vast diffusion, as they are in force in an increasing number of countries and regions (Olmos et al, 2012;Smith and Urpelainen, 2013;Shrimali et al, 2015). The trade dispute on RE products between the EU and China shows the significant effect of the policy on demand for the components (Bougette and Charlier, 2018).…”

Section: Yasuhiro Oguramentioning

confidence: 99%

China's Carbon-Energy Policy and Asia's Energy Transition

Mori¹

2021

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This book seeks to examine the impacts associated with China's carbonenergy policy in Asia and how, coupled with the Belt and Road Initiative, these effects prompt foreign direct investments in coal power and exports of renewable energy technologies.China shows a co-evolution of carbon-energy policy and energy transitions from coal to renewables. Assessing how the policy intensifies pressures and motivations to Chinese companies, chapters in this edited volume analyse how the policy has changed energy and CO 2 emissions in Asia through the lens of carbon leakage, relocation, and halos. Contributors present indepth studies on China's investments and exports, and also its impacts on Indonesia, India, Vietnam, and Japan. Using applied computable general equilibrium and scenario input-output analyses, chapters investigate if regional electricity connectivity reduces new coal power investments through efficiency gain. Arguing that China is shifting from the world's factory to the leading innovator and Asia's demand centre, it is ultimately demonstrated that China is likely to achieve climate targets whereas Asia to increase CO 2 emissions and economic reliance on China.China's Carbon-Energy Policy and Asia's Energy Transition will be of significant interest to students and scholars of energy, environment, and sustainability studies, as well as Chinese studies and economics.

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“…1 1 Mouzam et al (2016) empirically studied the anti‐dumping duties imposed by India on Chinese raw silk and the impact of this measure. Bougette and Charlier (2018) focused on the EU–China solar panel trade frictions and studied the price competition in duopoly markets with differentiated products. Hübler and Herdecke (2020) showed that US car tariffs are a credible threat to the EU, and China suffers from the US latest extended, tightened tariffs.…”

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Endogenous timing, strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly

Chen

Kuang

2022

Pacific Economic Review

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This paper builds an observable delay game in endogenous timing to study the possible occurrence of trade wars in a vertical, bilateral trade model. It examines the effects of production cost differences and order of moves on optimal tariffs, market equilibria, dumping margin and social welfare in both fixed timing and endogenous timing games. In a fixed timing game, it shows that price dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country-specific final good production costs. Different from Bernhofen (1995; Journal of International Economics), trade costs resulting from reciprocal tariffs in upstream markets can reverse the price dumping under certain conditions. In an endogenous timing game, this paper finds that the magnitude of cost differences significantly influences countries' decisions on the order of moves in a strategic tariff-making game. Both countries want to be the first movers under a small cost difference and consequently reach a simultaneous equilibrium result. This demonstrates that the second-best equilibrium proceeds under certain conditions. Under a large cost difference, sequential policy-making is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If the cost difference is sufficiently large, both countries have an incentive to launch a trade war as a multiple equilibrium game.* We are indebted to the editor, Professor David Cook, and two anonymous referees for constructive comments and helpful suggestions.

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Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies? Modeling the EU-China Solar Panel Dispute

Cited by 9 publications

References 47 publications

Determinants of Temporary Trade Barriers in Global Forest Products Industry

Determinants of Temporary Trade Barriers in Global Forest Products Industry

China's Carbon-Energy Policy and Asia's Energy Transition

Endogenous timing, strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly

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