Antidumping Echoing

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of "echoing" in antidumping (AD) cases (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter). We develop a dynamic game in which two competing importers can choose to impose an AD duty on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their importcompeting industries), we find that a country imposes an AD duty in the first (second) period independently of the other country's actions if its political-economy parameter is "very high" ("high"). Instead, it never introduces AD measures when its politicaleconomy parameter is below a critical "low" threshold. Echoing occurs for intermediate values of the political-economy parameter: a country chooses to impose an AD duty in the second period if and only if the competing importer has done so in the first period. Using a novel AD dataset, we document that echoing is a common practice among both traditional and new users of AD. In line with the conclusions of the theoretical model, the econometric results show that AD measures are more likely to be introduced in response to other countries' measures when governments care to some extent, but not too much, about their import-competing industries. Thus, this paper shows that countries' political-economy-driven trade policies are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation.

The trade effects of antidumping duties: Evidence from the 2004 EU enlargement

“…23 Since the time dimension of the panel only consists of two years (a pre-and a postexpectations, some exporters already set higher prices compared to a scenario without the presence of AD, thus affecting welfare in the importing country. 20 This finding also relates to the work on AD echoing by Tabakis and Zanardi (2016). The authors find that different importing countries tend to echo each others AD policies in the sense that they impose AD duties on products from the same exporter, either simultaneously or consecutively.…”

Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection

“…30 In conclusion, this paper offers yet further evidence that strategic interactions-either across countries or between a given country's policies-play a pivotal role in trade policy formulation (see, e.g., Bown and Crowley, 2007;Tabakis and Zanardi, 2017). In particular, we have demonstrated that a country's decision to engage in regionalism has important ramifications for its AD activity vis-à-vis the rest of the world.…”