Antinomies in the struggle for the transformation of the Kenyan constitution (1990–2010)

Abstract

How do social movements force fundamental constitutional changes in a polity? This article argues that it is the 'disruptive power' of movements that make them a force of change. By analysing waves of contemporary Kenyan struggles for constitutional and state reform, the article explains why it was only after 20 years of struggle, and in the aftermath of a major social conflict Á the 2008 postelection violence Á that constitutional reforms were successful. It further argues that it was the collective threats and fears posed by the post-election violence that forced an elite consensus necessary to deliver a new constitution in Kenya in 2010.

The Church and Constitutional Reforms in Kenya, 1992-2002: A Retrospective-Historical Analysis

“…In fact, Ufungamano as a corporate body of religious communities and leaders was not immune to internal division and conflicts that are inherent in CSOs. Mati astutely observes that "the Ufungamano Initiative was riddled with many contradictions and cleavages, which served both as opportunities but also constraints in its work (Mati, 2013). Particularly, the existing mistrust between radical civil society and opposition political elites offered an opportunity for moderation and arbitration by the religious leadership (Ibid).…”

Kenya: The struggle for a new constitutional order, edited by Godwin R. Murunga, Duncan Okello and Ahders Sjogren, London, Zed Books, 2014, xi+192pp, $134.95 (Hardback), ISBN 978-1-78032-366-4

“…The latter demand intensified as it became evident, following repeated manipulated general elections in 1992 and 1997, that the mere tweaking of the constitution to reintroduce multiparty politics was insufficient to entrench and safeguard democracy. The architecture of power created by the pre-2010 constitution made the effective practice of plural politics impossible and prevented the country's transition from an imperial presidency to a constitutional democracy (Kramon and Posner 2011;Mati 2013;. Moi and KANU left power following the 2002 elections, but constitutional reforms remained elusive for almost another decade after Mwai Kibaki, who came to power riding on the wave of democratisation, assumed the presidency.…”

Emergence of inter-identity alliances in struggles for transformation of the Kenyan constitution

“…This question, though pertinent, is beyond the purview of the present paper. Nonetheless, one can say here, as has been argued elsewhere, that class, religious and ethnic cleavages played a crucial role in the collapse and ultimate abortion of the constitution reform project in the 2005 constitution referendum (Mati 2012a;2012b;2013). The tools that destroyed these alliances had class, generational as well as gender dimensions and came to be displayed at different times in the constitution reform contentions.…”

“…Moreover, even when the stalled constitutional reform project was restarted and succeeded after the 2007 post-election violence, the resultant constitution reflects bargains around elite interests than the distribution concerns that activists from the lower classes had been pushing for (Murunga 2014;Mati 2013). Moreover, given the lack of genuine exchange, while the interactions between different classes suggest some inter-class interdependence in these struggles, it also points to what Gould (1998) calls networks of patronage where middleclass activists and their organisations act as patrons to their lower class clients (Polletta and Jasper 2001, p.288).…”