Antitrust Compliance: Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior

Paha, Johannes

doi:10.1002/mde.2840

Cited by 21 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 57 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Also, managerial economics covers profit management in an organizational setting. It directs business executives on how to manage profits made from conducting business activities, given profits are the primary measure of the performance and growth of a company [6]. Another scope of managerial economics entails capital management because making lucrative capital investment choices make up complex activities managers undertakes.…”

Section: Scope Of Managerial Economicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Financial managers in organizations can use this approach to management to properly manage an organization's generated profits. The models of managerial economics are vital in monitoring and controlling the profits made by an organization through making informed investments using surplus profits [6]. As observed by economics in organizational management, profit is the ultimate objective of all business enterprises; managing generated profits would establish an organization's success and growth rates.…”

Section: Business Activities' Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Also, managerial economics can help business executives to conduct successful assessments of an organization's cost and production levels in contrast to its leading competitors. The concepts of the discipline emphasize reducing the costs of operating a business and establishing the expenses related to various business operations [6]. The construct is also efficient in discovering organization-based cost-reducing the levels of production to confirm that there does not exist a business that wastes organizational resources.…”

Section: Business Planningmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Nature, Scope and Role of Managerial Economics in Business

Gao¹

2023

Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Managerial economics plays a significant role in the management of business enterprises because it helps managers develop a wide range of leadership traits that streamline business decisions for the long term. The model allows managers to make informed decisions that ensure an organization make sustainable profits and attain positive growth rates. Since decision-making and business management are inseparable concepts, managerial economics helps managers achieve business functions such as planning, hiring, and company organization. Managers often consider several options to reach a workable conclusion based on the variables surrounding a particular situation. Thus, managerial economics helps the decision-making in organizations as making informed decisions is at the core of management. This essay will discuss the nature and scope of managerial economics and point out the role and significance of the business concept in a business setting. The paper achieves this by highlighting that business executives are required to choose the best available alternatives and adopt specific approaches to management. Data will be collected, and findings analyzed to provide a detailed conclusion on managerial economics' scope, nature, and role in business.

show abstract

Section: Scope Of Managerial Economicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Business Activities' Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Business Planningmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Nature, Scope and Role of Managerial Economics in Business

Gao¹

2023

Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The literature on business-cycle fluctuations and collusive behavior has inspired more recent work by Spagnolo (2005) and Paha (2017), who both consider managerial incentives and the effect of business-cycle fluctuation when managers are risk averse. 3 Spagnolo (2005) considers risk aversion and i.i.d shocks that align closely with RS.…”

Section: Literature Review and Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Chapters Exploring Themes in Competition and Collusion

Strathearn¹

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this thesis I present three chapters that explore various themes in competition with a focus on collusion and spatial competition.Chapter one examines whether the availability of late-stage settlements for defendants in criminal price-fixing suits has a negative impact on the effectiveness of early stage leniency programs in the context of antitrust enforcement. Our main finding is that an appropriately designed settlement program can make collusion more difficult: in equilibrium, the adoption of an optimal settlement program by an antitrust authority (AA) reduces the occurrence of cartels by decreasing the long-run gains from collusion. However, overly generous settlement policies may undermine leniency programs and encourage the formation of more cartels.Chapter two explores the relationship between business-cycle fluctuations and collusive behavior. From a theoretical perspective, we demonstrate that the degree of antitrust enforcement (external cartel stability) directly influences the boundary that determines whether positive demand shocks are either pro-collusive or anti-collusive.We find that as cartels become increasingly unstable, they have a preference for defecting in the presence of positive demand shocks since there is riskiness associated with continuing to collude under a strong enforcement regime. From an empirical perspective, we find that the observed collusive activity is weakly procyclical, however, much of the variation is explained by enforcement and monitoring policies.

show abstract

Settlements in the presence of leniency programs: Costs and benefits

Strathearn,

Chen,

Ross

2023

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Over the last few decades, leniency programs have become important components of anti‐cartel policies in many jurisdictions. An extensive literature shows how such programs can destabilize cartels and even discourage their formation in the first place. Much less studied are settlement policies under which reduced fines are offered to settling parties late in the prosecution (when the probability of conviction is high). In particular, there has been little attention paid to the interaction of leniency and settlement policies. This paper examines whether the availability of late‐stage settlements could negatively impact the effectiveness of early‐stage leniency programs. Our main finding is that an appropriately designed settlement program can make collusion more difficult: In equilibrium, the adoption of an optimal settlement program by the Antitrust Authority reduces the occurrence of cartels by decreasing the long‐run gain from collusion. However, an overly generous settlement policy may undermine leniency programs and encourage the formation of more cartels.

show abstract

Antitrust Compliance: Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior

Cited by 21 publications

References 57 publications

The Nature, Scope and Role of Managerial Economics in Business

The Nature, Scope and Role of Managerial Economics in Business

Three Chapters Exploring Themes in Competition and Collusion

Settlements in the presence of leniency programs: Costs and benefits

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About