Application of game theory in risk management of urban natural gas pipelines

Li, Xinhong; Ma, Jing; Han, Zhiyu; Zhang, Yi; Yang, Ming

doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2023.105037

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 22 publications

(21 reference statements)

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“…Both parties of the game are rational economists with their interests, and all the benefits, costs, and expenses in the model can be quantified [40]. The government's choice of active regulation and negative regulation strategy mainly depends on the government's profit expectations [41,42]. The process of enterprise pollution control involves basic enterprise revenue, regulatory costs, and incentives.…”

Section: Hypothesis 3 (H3)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the Dynamic Evolution Game of Government, Enterprise and the Public to Control Industrial Pollution

Yu,

2024

Sustainability

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This paper proposes a two-party evolutionary game model of government and enterprise to solve the dilemma of industrial pollution control and explore the mode of government and enterprise collaborative governance. The local equilibrium points of the game model in four cases are calculated and analyzed, and the results show that government power alone cannot help enterprises achieve an ideal level of pollution reduction, and it is necessary to introduce public power for supervision. Based on the above, a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the government, the public, and the enterprise is proposed. When the costs and benefits of the tripartite game players meet certain conditions, the system will evolve to a state of equilibrium (0,1,1). Following the current situation of economic development in China, the parameters of the two-party and tripartite evolutionary game are assigned, and the operating path and system’s evolution trajectory of the two-party and tripartite industrial pollution control are simulated by Matlab R2016a software. It is indicated that whether the government participates in supervision or not, an enterprise will actively control pollution under strong public supervision, which can provide feasible suggestions for the selection of industrial pollution control policies.

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Section: Hypothesis 3 (H3)mentioning

confidence: 99%