Applications of mechanism design in market-based demand-side management: A review

Abedrabboh, Khaled; Al‐Fagih, Luluwah

doi:10.1016/j.rser.2022.113016

Cited by 27 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 122 publications

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“…Type III DER provider is assumed to have level-2 AC chargers with a maximum power of 19.2 kW each [42]. EV data [43], arrival/departure times, initial/requested SoC levels, along with all data and code used in this simulation can be accessed at [44]. Inverter efficiency is assumed to be 0.98 [41].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors in [15] propose a double auction mechanism based on a multi-armed bandit algorithm for energy trading between prosumers, where buyers/sellers select their bid prices from a discrete price set that is bounded from below by the FIT and by the grid price from above. The common limitation of these studies is that they treat the various DER energy services as substitutable items, failing to capture their complementary nature [8].…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Iterative mechanisms can have convergence speed concerns and can be manipulated by strategic behaviour (cf. [8]). Table 1 summarises the research gaps and highlights the contributions of the proposed CDA.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the main challenges of DER sharing is the design of a local energy market (LEM) that governs the strategic interactions between the DER owners and the consumers who wish to utilise DER energy services. A market mechanism consists of a tuple ⟨B, µ, π⟩; a messaging (bidding) space B where market players interact by sharing information or by submitting their bids, an allocation rule µ that maps the players' bids to an outcome, and a payment rule π [8]. The challenge is to design the rules of the DER sharing market in a way that allocates the limited energy resources efficiently (i.e., in a way that maximises social welfare) while also preserving the privacy of consumers (i.e., without asking them to share their private information).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Combinatorial Double Auction for Community Shared Distributed Energy Resources

2023

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The integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as renewable energy (RE) and energy storage systems, can have many environmental and economic benefits. The sharing of medium-scale DERs can enhance these benefits by ensuring efficient resource utilisation and can promote sharing economy and economies of scale opportunities. In this paper, we design a combinatorial double auction (CDA) for DER sharing between multiple DER providers and a community of consumers. The proposed DER market addresses the complementarity of DER services and supports the environmentally sustainable behaviour of consumers. The purpose of the proposed auction is to allocate the limited DER resources efficiently without compromising the privacy or the comfort of consumers. First, the combinatorial bidding rules are designed and the social welfare optimisation problem is formulated. Then, utility maximising strategies for consumers with both economic and environmental objectives are proposed. Additionally, three types of DER providers are introduced, and their revenue maximising strategies are investigated. A case study with real world RE

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Combinatorial Double Auction for Community Shared Distributed Energy Resources

2023

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“…These characteristics can be represented by the following piece-wise linear utility function: where α and β are predetermined parameters that represent the increase in utility αDR from any surplus vaccines β . Piece-wise linear utility function formulations were used in the context of energy (see [ 34 ] and the references therein), computing [ 35 , 36 ], and behavioural economics [ 37 , 38 ]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that proposes a piece-wise linear function formulation to represent the utility countries get when receiving vaccine allocations.…”

Section: Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism design for a fair and equitable approach to global vaccine distribution: The case of COVID-19

Abedrabboh,

Al-Majid,

Al-Fagih

et al. 2023

PLOS Glob Public Health

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Vaccines are one of the most effective tools humanity has in the fight against pandemics. One of the major challenges of vaccine distribution is achieving fair and equitable allocation across the countries of the world, regardless of their economic wealth. The self-interested behaviour of high-income countries and the underutilisation of vaccines allocated to underprepared countries are some of the failures reported during COVID-19 vaccine roll-out. These shortcomings have motivated the need for a central market mechanism that takes into account the countries’ vulnerability to COVID-19 and their readiness to distribute and administer their allocated vaccines. In this paper, we leverage game theory to study the problem of equitable global vaccine distribution and propose a fair market mechanism that aligns self-interested behaviour with optimal global objectives. First, we model the interaction between a central vaccine provider (e.g. COVAX) and a country reporting its demand as a two-player game, and discuss the Nash and mixed Nash equilibria of that game. Then, we propose a repeated auction mechanism with an artificial payment system for allocating vaccines among participating countries, where each auction round is based on a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. The proposed allocation mechanism aims at minimising deaths and incentivises the self-interested countries to report their demand truthfully. Compared with real-world COVAX allocation decisions, our results show that the proposed auction mechanism achieves more efficient outcomes that maximise the number of averted deaths. Pragmatic considerations are investigated and policy recommendations are discussed.

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Demand Side Management and Transactive Energy Strategies for Smart Cities

Ponce,

Peffer,

Mendez Garduno

et al. 2023

Studies in Big Data

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Applications of mechanism design in market-based demand-side management: A review

Cited by 27 publications

References 122 publications

A Combinatorial Double Auction for Community Shared Distributed Energy Resources

A Combinatorial Double Auction for Community Shared Distributed Energy Resources

Mechanism design for a fair and equitable approach to global vaccine distribution: The case of COVID-19

Demand Side Management and Transactive Energy Strategies for Smart Cities

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