Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks

Abstract

With new security threats cropping up every day, finding a real-time and smart protection strategy for critical infrastructure has become a big challenge. Game theory is suitable for solving this problem, for it provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the intelligent decisions from both attackers and defenders. However, existing methods are only based on complete information and only consider a single type of attacker, which is not always available in realistic situations. Furthermore, although infrastructure interconnection has been greatly improved, there is a lack of methods considering network characteristics. To overcome these limitations, we focus on the problem of infrastructure network protection under asymmetry information. We present a novel method to measure the performance of infrastructure from the network perspective. Moreover, we propose a false network construction method to simulate how the defender applies asymmetric information to defend against the attacker actively. Meanwhile, we consider multiple types of attackers and introduce the Bayesian Stackelberg game to build the model. Experiments in real infrastructure networks reveal that our approach can improve infrastructure protection performance. Our method gives a brand new way to approach the problem of infrastructure security defense.

Leveraging Computational Intelligence Techniques for Defensive Deception: A Review, Recent Advances, Open Problems and Future Directions

“…Deception-based defenses are potent weapons that have been proven to work in various domains. Their efficacy is based on the fact that they are programmed to exploit key biases to appear realistic but misleading substitutes to the hidden reality [ 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96 , 97 , 98 , 99 , 100 , 101 , 102 , 103 , 104 , 105 , 106 , 107 , 108 ]. As a result, one will require a thorough understanding of both offensive and defensive trickery to implement a perfect Deception strategy.…”

Dynamic Defense against Stealth Malware Propagation in Cyber-Physical Systems: A Game-Theoretical Framework

“…To address the challenge of CPS security, researchers have paid a great attention on the security issues of malwares propagation, such as propagation modeling, prevention, detection, and mitigation [ 20 , 21 , 22 ]. However, the unprotected exposure is usually neglected and few of them have considered the trade-off between safety and security when using light-weight countermeasures.…”

“…In order to take attackers reaction into account, Durkota et al [ 43 ] studied the optimal strategy making of placement of honeypots in a network using a game-theoretic approach. Using the Bayesian Stackelberg Game, Zeng, et al [ 22 ] studied the problem of infrastructure network protection under asymmetry information in which multiple attackers types were considered and Bayesian Stackelberg game was introduced to model this problem.…”

Protecting Infrastructure Networks: Solving the Stackelberg Game with Interval-Valued Intuitionistic Fuzzy Number Payoffs

“…Li et al [17] applied a Stackelberg game model to complex networks and evaluated the effects of cost-sensitive parameters. Zeng et al [18,19] proposed a false network construction method and applied Stackelberg and Bayesian Stackelberg game models for the defense of critical infrastructure networks. Fu et al [20] established a Stackelberg game model based on camouflage strategies and proposed an evolutionary rule to optimize these strategies.…”