Appointed or Elected? How Mayoral Accountability Impacts the Provision of Policing

Abstract

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Black mayors and crime

“…Other work on management quality focuses on the mayor specifically. Colombo and Tojerow (2020) find that improving mayoral accountability decreases crime, whereas Akhtari, Moreira, and Trucco (2022) find that political influences can reduce the quality of the provision of public goods through the link of political and bureaucratic turnover.…”