Approachability with delayed information

Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Ehud

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.010

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 17 publications

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“…When some player (coalition) deviates from the cooperative trajectory in some stage, other players (coalitions) would use the trigger strategies from the next stage. But this does not include the case, in which the trigger strategies could be used after several stages, perhaps because the information is delayed or the players in one coalition need time to coordinate their actions (see [13][14][15][16]). While in a finite stage game, to construct Nash or strong Nash equilibria, we need more strict conditions, which is the case with perfect information (see [17]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games

Wang

Liu

Xue

et al. 2018

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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The problem of strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games is studied. The sufficient conditions related to discount factors are presented, which guarantee the existence of Nash or strong Nash equilibria in such games and therefore guarantee the strategic stability of cooperative solutions. The deviating payoffs of players are given directly, which are related closely to these conditions and avoid the loss of super-additivity of a class of general characteristic functions. As an illustration, Nash and strong Nash equilibria are found for the repeated infinite stage Prisoner’s dilemma game.

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