Approval voting in scientific and engineering societies

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C.

doi:10.1007/bf00562689

Cited by 20 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…We illustrate our method with the analysis of a data set from an election of the Mathematical Association of America (see Brams, 1988;Brams and Fishburn, 1992). The raw frequencies as well as the estimates of C (see Theorem 1) are reported in Table 1.…”

Section: An Illustrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We illustrate our technique on a data set 2 from an election of the Mathematical Association of America (see Brams, 1988;Brams and Fishburn, 1992). On this data set we show that the conditions for the size-independent model hold, we check for the existence of a social welfare order and/ or Condorcet candidates, and we compute the Borda scores.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering

Regenwetter

Grofman

1998

Social Choice and Welfare

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Abstract.``Subset voting'' denotes a choice situation where one ®xed set of choice alternatives (candidates, products) is o ered to a group of decision makers, each of whom is requested to pick a subset containing any number of alternatives. In the context of subset voting we merge three choice paradigms,``approval voting``from political science, the``weak utility model'' from mathematical psychology, and``social welfare orderings'' from social choice theory. We use a probabilistic choice model proposed by Falmagne and Regenwetter (1996) built upon the notion that each voter has a personal ranking of the alternatives and chooses a subset at the top of the ranking. Using an extension of Sen's (1966) theorem about value restriction, we provide necessary and su cient conditions for this empirically testable choice model to yield a social welfare ordering. Furthermore, we develop a method to compute Borda scores and Condorcet winners from subset choice probabilities. The technique is illustrated on an election of the Mathematical Association of America (Brams, 1988).

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Section: An Illustrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering

Regenwetter

Grofman

1998

Social Choice and Welfare

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“…See Brams and Fishburn (1991) for further discussion of strategic considerations under approval voting.…”

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confidence: 99%

Voting on Growth Control Measures: Preferences and Strategies*

Dubin

Kiewiet

Noussair

1992

Economics & Politics

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Citizens of many California cities and counties have sought to restrict the rate of population growth in their localities. In 1988, Citizens for Limited Growth used the initiative process to place a pair of growth control measures on the ballot in the City and County of San Diego, respectively. The City Council and Board of Supervisors responded by placing less stringent, competing measures on the same ballot. This paper analyzes voting data from this election to examine the nature of support for such measures. We find strong support for the hypotheses that whites, homeowners, liberal/environmentalists, and those exposed to high levels of traffic congestion are more likely to favor growth controls. This paper also investigates the behavior of voters when they confront competing propositions concerning the same issue on the same ballot, and finds strong evidence of strategic voting.

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“…Another example may be approval voting, where, in effect, each ballot is reflexive, complete, and transitive and defines two indifference classes, the approved and disapproved candidates, and xφy if and only if x has at least as many approvals as y. It appears that the main arenas for approval voting are elections of officers in large professional organizations (Brams and Fishburn (1992)). Assume that each voter has linear preference φ i and the ballot contains φ i together with a number a i , so that voter i approves candidate R(i, j) if and only if j ≤ a i .…”

Section: A Democratic Idea: Every Vote Countsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts

Stensholt

2004

SIAM Rev.

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Some tally methods for preferential elections are discussed from the following point of view: How well do they respect a wish from the voter that subsidiary votes in the ballot cannot hurt the chances of the ballot's top-ranked candidate? The standard variation of single transferable votes (STV) is constructed to obey this principle, but other defects show up, in particular nonmonotonicity, premature eliminations, and free rides. The tax cut algorithm is also an essential part of Meek's modification of STV. Properties of the algorithm are established and other ways to apply it are considered, with the purpose of reducing the election method's weaknesses without losing too many of its strengths.

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Approval voting in scientific and engineering societies

Cited by 20 publications

References 9 publications

Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering

Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering

Voting on Growth Control Measures: Preferences and Strategies*

Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts

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