Approximately Efficient Iterative Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges

Biswas, Sourav; Narahari, Y.

doi:10.1109/cec.2009.61

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…The price update rule increases the price by a fixed small amount d from the current price, which is introduced by Lavi and Nisan [17]. More recently, Biswas and Narahari [4] applied this rule in developing efficient iterative auction mechanisms for combinatorial exchanges. Their numerical experiments show that the choice of different d leads to different results.…”

Section: Multiple Asynchronous Auction Processesmentioning

confidence: 98%

A multi-agent and auction-based framework and approach for carrier collaboration

Dai

Chen

2011

Logist. Res.

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Carrier collaboration in transportation means multiple carriers form an alliance to optimize their transportation operations through sharing transportation requests and vehicle capacities. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent and auction-based framework and approach for carrier collaboration in less than truckload transportation. In this framework, the carriers outsource/acquire requests through multiple auctions, one for outsourcing each request; a carrier acts as an auctioneer when it wants to outsource a request to other carriers, whereas the carrier acts as a bidder when it wants to acquire a request from other carriers; for each carrier, which requests it should outsource and acquire are determined by solving its outsourcing requests selection problem and requests bidding problem, respectively. These two decision problems are formulated as mixed integer programming problems. The auction of each request is multiround; in each round, the auctioneer determines the outsourcing price of the request and each bidder determines whether it acquires the request at the given price; the auctioneer lowers the outsourcing price if multiple carriers bid for the request or raises the price if no carrier bids for it. The auction process continues until only one carrier bids for the request or a given number of rounds are achieved. In the second case, if no agent bids for the request, then it is returned to the outsourcing agent; if multiple bidding agents compete for the request, a conflict resolution procedure is used to determine which carrier wins it. The approach is decentralized, asynchronous, and dynamic, where multiple auctions may occur simultaneously and interact with each other. The performance of the approach is evaluated by randomly generated instances and compared with an individual planning approach and a centralized planning approach.

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Section: Multiple Asynchronous Auction Processesmentioning

confidence: 98%

A multi-agent and auction-based framework and approach for carrier collaboration

Dai

Chen

2011

Logist. Res.

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“…These include: services exchange, collaborative planning [3], adwords exchanges, logistics and transportation exchanges [4], [5], [6], bandwidth exchanges [7], supply chain coordination [8], e-procurement exchanges [9], [10], stock exchanges, and exchanges for sale of excess inventory. Combinatorial exchanges (CEs) have major economic advantages due to the power of combinatorial bidding and highly expressive bidding languages [11], [12]. However, they are, at the same time notoriously complex from a computational angle.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An iterative auction mechanism for combinatorial exchanges

Biswas

Narahari

2010

2010 IEEE International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering

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Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. In this paper, we develop computationally efficient iterative auction mechanisms for solving combinatorial exchanges. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality (IR) and budgetnonnegativity (BN) properties. We also show that our method is bounded and convergent. Our numerical experiments show that our algorithm produces good quality solutions and is computationally efficient.

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