Are Cooperative R&amp;D Agreements Good For The Society?

Ghosh, Satyajit; Ghosh, Sarah

doi:10.19030/jber.v12i3.8737

Cited by 5 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We will study the first and the third policies. 7 But first we are assuming here that the sum of capital they have is strictly less than the amount of capital needed to conduct the R&D activity.…”

Section: Government Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These two ensure that they will confess their true types to the Government. 7 We did not study tax reduction as a policy because we did not assume that the output or the profit of the firms are taxed by the Government. Also the analysis of lump-sum tax reduction is identical to that of the subsidy, which we have studied below.…”

Section: Cheap Capitalmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Brocas (2004) [2] mentions that in context of R&D rivalry, socially optimal 1 The amount of investment in any R&D activity might vary depending on maturity time for the concerned activity 2 Kabiraj and Chattopadhyay (2014) [9] 3 Hall and Lerner (2009) [8] outcome might not materialise, and therefore, the policymakers have developed various tools to encourage and promote collaborative R&D to mitigate the inefficiencies generated in the process. As noted by Ghosh and Ghosh (2014) [7] in US the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 was designed to promote cooperative R&D ventures among firms. The Governments can adopt different types of policies for this, e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Collaborative Research and Rate of Interests

Chatterjee

Chattopadhyay

2015

Studies in Microeconomics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper makes an attempt to link collaborative research in industry with Government initiative and market rate of interests. Two firms involved in Cournot competition in the market are deciding whether to conduct research to device a technique for cost reduction. Amount of cost reduction after the research and the initial amount of capital possessed by each firm are private information to each of the firms. In particular both of them are having capacity constraint. Our objective here is to figure out the impacts of the lending and borrowing rates of interest on collaborative research. In the process we study the effectiveness of different policies to encourage collaborative R&D.

show abstract

Section: Government Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cheap Capitalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Collaborative Research and Rate of Interests

Chatterjee

Chattopadhyay

2015

Studies in Microeconomics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…That is why in some countries the governments encourage RJVs for corporate research by giving direct subsidy, tax credit and infrastructural support. To promote RJVs among firms in the US, the National Cooperative Research Act was designed (Ghosh & Ghosh, 2014). Amir and Wooders (2000) provide conditions for formation of RJVs and the associated social benefits in presence of one-way spillover of a process innovation under a duopoly market structure.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information

Chatterjee

Chattopadhyay

Kabiraj

2018

Studies in Microeconomics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Spillovers of R&D outcome affect the R&D decision of a firm. The present paper discusses the R&D incentives of a firm when the extent of R&D spillover is private information to each firm. We construct a two-stage game involving two firms when the firms first decide simultaneously whether to invest in R&D or not, then they compete in quantity. Assuming general distribution function of firm types we compare R&D incentives of firms under alternative scenarios based on different informational structures. The paper shows that while R&D spillovers reduce R&D incentives under complete information unambiguously, however, it can be larger under incomplete information. JEL Classification: D43, D82, L13, O31

show abstract

“…For instance, see d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),Suzumura (1992),Kamien et al (1992) andGhosh and Ghosh (2014). 2 A comprehensive analysis on the relation between R&D investment and R&D appropriability can be found inLevin et al (1987).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

When Spillovers Enhance R&D Incentives

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is commonly believed that spillover reduces R&D incentives of a firm. This happen because of the non-appropriability problem. However, some empirical literature shows the possibility of enhanced R&D incentives under spillovers. While this is explained in the literature under incomplete information, we show that this may hold even under complete information. We show in particular that in a duopoly there are situations when with no spillovers only one firm invests in R&D, but under spillovers both the firms invest. This occurs when there is complementarity in research and the spillover is below a critical level.

show abstract

Are Cooperative R&D Agreements Good For The Society?

Abstract: ABSTRACT

Cited by 5 publications

References 11 publications

Collaborative Research and Rate of Interests

Collaborative Research and Rate of Interests

Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information

When Spillovers Enhance R&D Incentives

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About