Are Digital Images Allographic?

Abstract

Nelson Goodman's distinction between autographic and allographic arts is appealing, we suggest, because it promises to resolve several prima facie puzzles. We consider and rebut a recent argument that alleges that digital images explode the autographic/allographic distinction. Regardless, there is another familiar problem with the distinction, especially as Goodman formulates it: it seems to entirely ignore an important sense in which all artworks are historical. We note in reply that some artworks can be considered both as historical products and as formal structures. Talk about such works is ambiguous between the two conceptions. This allows us to recover Goodman's distinction: art forms that are ambiguous in this way are allographic. With that formulation settled, we argue that digital images are allographic. We conclude by considering the objection that digital photographs, unlike other digital images, would count as autographic by our criterion; we reply that this points to the vexed nature of photography rather than any problem with the distinction.

Why Digital Pictures Are Not Notational Representations

“…Here we are treating maps of the RGB values for pixels as the characters of the notation. (D'Cruz and Magnus , 421)…”

“…Thus they write: “Zeimbekis's fixation on the limits of visual acuity strikes us as a red herring. It presumes that, in order to count as instances of the same digital picture, two screen displays must be indistinguishable” (D'Cruz and Magnus , 421). First, I make no such assumption; identity of appearances is only singled out as an important example of identity, given that the end user of so many pictures is the human visual system: “I focus mainly on phenomenal (perceptual) identity, but the article's conclusions also apply to other epistemic forms of identity” (Zeimbekis , 44).…”

“…D'Cruz and Magnus appeal to Goodman to reject this proposal:

Goodman would reject Zeimbekis's suggestion that all artwork becomes allographic once we are able to make duplicates that differ only in respects “below some epistemically defined discrimination threshold.” As Goodman has it, there is no defensible threshold that marks the boundary between aesthetically relevant features and nonrelevant ones.All that matters for a work's autographic status (on Goodman's account) is that discrimination is possible in principle. (D'Cruz and Magnus , 421)

…”

“…All that matters for a work's autographic status (on Goodman's account) is that discrimination is possible in principle. (D'Cruz and Magnus , 421)…”

“…In a recent article, Jason D'Cruz and P. D. Magnus reject points (ii) and (iii) (, Section III ). Concerning (i), they agree that digital pictures are allographic, but they argue that they are allographic because they are notational, whereas I argue that digital pictures are allographic despite not being notational.…”