2018
DOI: 10.1108/raf-04-2016-0066
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Are earnings strings restrained after SOX?

Abstract: Purpose This paper aims to examine whether external monitors (auditors and analysts) constrain earnings strings, an indicator of earnings management, and whether this monitoring is more effective after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), given the emphasis of SOX on improving auditing, financial reporting and the information environment. Design/methodology/approach Agency theory establishes the premise between external monitoring and earnings strings. Auditor tenure and number of anal… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…2. Kohlbeck et al (2018) find that analysts might play a monitoring role in restraining earnings strings. In this study, we focus on the analysts' role as information intermediaries in communicating their opinions about the likelihood of discontinuation of earnings strings to capital market participants.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2. Kohlbeck et al (2018) find that analysts might play a monitoring role in restraining earnings strings. In this study, we focus on the analysts' role as information intermediaries in communicating their opinions about the likelihood of discontinuation of earnings strings to capital market participants.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…5. Kohlbeck et al (2018) finds that, post-sarbanes-oxley (SOX), earnings strings are shorter when the client is audited by more effective auditors, but they do not examine the break in the string in their study.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead, we are interested in whether there 1 Here, we are referring to studies that examine quarterly earnings benchmarks. For studies examining annual benchmarks (Canace et al, 2018;Dechow et al, 2003;Kohlbeck et al, 2018), the third benchmark is achieving a positive earnings change over the prior year.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%