Are Gaps Preferred to Gluts? A Closer Look at Borderline Contradictions

Abstract

This paper examines the acceptance of so-called borderline contradictions involving vague adjectives. A close look at the available data from previous studies indicates a preference for "gappy" descriptions of the form "x is neither P nor not P " over "glutty" descriptions of the form "x is P and not P ". We present the results of an experiment in which we tested for that difference systematically, using relative gradable adjectives. Our findings confirm that both kinds of descriptions are accepted, but indeed that "neither"-descriptions are to a large extent preferred to "and"-descriptions. We examine several possible explanations for that preference. Our account relies on the distinction proposed by Cobreros et al. between strict and tolerant meaning for vague adjectives, as well as on a specific implementation of the strongest meaning hypothesis endorsed by Cobreros et al. as well as Alxatib and Pelletier. Our approach, however, argues in favor of local pragmatic strengthening instead of global strengthening in order to derive that preference.

Revealing Criterial Vagueness in Inconsistencies

“…The individual-level symptoms of vagueness that were discussed in the introduction for nouns have also been shown to exist for gradable adjectives. They too show competing responses to borderline items (borderline contradictions; see Alxatib & Pelletier, 2011; Egré & Zehr, 2018; Hersh & Caramazza, 1976; Ripley, 2011), increased reaction times and decreased confidence ratings for borderline items (Brownell & Caramazza, 1978; Hersh & Caramazza, 1976), and inconsistent responding across categorization sessions (Egré, de Gardelle, & Ripley, 2013; Hersh & Caramazza, 1976). Solt (2018) offers a treatment of how degree and criterial vagueness can account for inter- and intraindividual differences in the application of gradable adjectives.…”

Subjectivity in gradable adjectives: The case oftallandheavy

“…Moreover, inconsistent answers are frequently produced when these kinds of judgments are repeated (Égré, de Gardelle & Ripley, ; Hersh & Caramazza, ). Subjects have also been shown to experience difficulty when deciding membership for one‐dimensional borderline stimuli (i.e., produce longer RTs and lower confidence ratings, Brownell & Caramazza, ; Hersh & Caramazza, ) or do not decide at all, and both apply and deny the predicate (Alxatib & Pelletier, ; Égré & Zehr, ; Ripley, ). These findings have spurred the development of probabilistic accounts of vagueness in which the decision to apply a predicate to a stimulus or not includes an element of chance (Égré, ; Verheyen, Hampton & Storms, ).…”

Vague judgment: a probabilistic account

“…For more on the pragmatic explanation of the acceptance of borderline contradictions, I refer toAlxatib et al (2013),Cobreros et al (2014) andEgré and Zehr (2016).15 In the color experiment, the response curves for "x is blue" and "x is not blue" do intersect at a…”

“…Also, the present model does not concern itself with finer differences in acceptance between "x is tall and not tall" versus "x is neither tall nor not tall". I refer to Egré and Zehr (2016) for a study of that question.…”