Are humans born to hate? Three myths and three developmental lessons about the origins of social categorization and inter-group bias

Abstract

Are humans born to hate? The present chapter considers three common claims about the nature of social categorization—that humans are predisposed to racism, to dislike out-groups, and to think of differences between people in the same way as they think about differences between animal species—and addresses the developmental evidence on which these claims are based. Consideration of the processes underlying the emergence of these phenomena across childhood provides new insight into how to prevent the development of prejudice and improve inter-group relations.

Beliefs about social norms and racial inequalities predict variation in the early development of racial bias

“…These results are consistent with the argument that essentialist beliefs about racial inequalities in the United States reinforce racist ideologies that Black people occupy lower status positions because they are supposed to occupy those positions (i.e., because of "who they are on the inside"; Mandalaywala, 2020;Rhodes, 2020;. That is, perceiving racial inequalities as a direct result of essential differences between groups supports the development of representations of White people as intrinsically more valuable social partners because of their higher status and representations of Black people as intrinsically less valuable social partners because of their lower status.…”

“…Yet, how children explain racial inequalities may lead them to form problematic conclusions about racial groups that are defined by society as lower status. For example, the cognitive bias to explain observed patterns in the world through inherent/intrinsic features may lead children to develop essentialist beliefs about racial inequalities (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014;Mandalaywala, 2020;Rhodes, 2020). That is, through observing consistent differences in how members of various racial groups are positioned within society, children may infer that racial inequalities reflect fundamental, essential, and intrinsic differences between groups.…”

A (failed) attempt to falsify the alliance hypothesis of racial categorization: Racial categorization is not reduced when crossed with a nonalliance category.

“…For example, it may just be that any cross-cutting dimension-whether it be an alliance or notwill also reduce racial categorization. In other words, the counterhypothesis that racial categorization is simply more flexible than is categorization by accent, sex, or age has never been empirically tested (a reasonable counterhypothesis, given that racial detection is more malleable and later developing than is biological sex or age detection; e.g., Hirschfeld, 1996;Rhodes, 2020).…”

“…In other words, the counterhypothesis that racial categorization is simply more flexible than is categorization by accent, sex, or age has never been empirically-tested (a reasonable counterhypothesis, given that racial detection is more malleable and later developing than is biological sex or age detection; e.g. Hirschfeld, 1996;Rhodes, 2020). This state of affairs leaves the alliance hypothesis in a precarious state.…”

Political preferences and threat perception: opportunities for neuroimaging and developmental research

“…For example, we can ask how threat perceptions are transmitted from parents to children. Children's attitudes towards social groups are correlated with their parents' political attitudes [53]. Similarity between parents and children, for example in overall fearfulness, is partly explained by shared genes, but the family environment is also important [54,55].…”