Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate

Abstract

The public debate over the need to raise judicial salaries has been one-sided. Sentiment appears to be that judges are underpaid. But neither theory nor evidence provides much support for this view. The primary argument being made in favor of a pay increase is that it will raise the quality of judging. Theory suggests that increasing judicial salaries will improve judicial performance only if judges can be sanctioned for performing inadequately or if the appointments process reliably screens out low-ability candidates. However, federal judges and many state judges cannot be sanctioned, and the reliability of screening processes is open to question. An empirical study of the high court judges of the fifty states provides little evidence that raising salaries would improve judicial performance.

Growing Justice: Justice Policies and Transaction Costs

“…Making money for courts available and asking judges to render neutral decisions in conflicts is not enough to create access to neutral decision making . Empirical research confirms that hiring more judges does not increase the productivity of the courts (Beenstock and Haitovsky 2004), nor does a salary increase (Choi, Gulati et al 2009). These outcomes are understandable, because just giving judges the task to decide disputes does not make it easier for clients to determine what courts should do for them, to monitor court performance, and to make them satisfy client needs.…”

“…Unfortunately, the independence of courts is not only a valuable principle of state organization, but also a shield against incentives that would align the interests of courts closer to those of their clients (Posner 1993;Cabrillo and Fitzpatrick 2008;Choi, Gulati et al 2009). Opportunities for interactions with the parties that are normally a good way to align the interests of principals (clients) and agents (courts) have to be curtailed because of the danger of corruption.…”

Understanding the Time to Court Case Resolution: A Competing Risks Analysis Using Belgian Data

“…Finally, a judge in our sample on average possesses more than eight years of adjudicative experience at the time of the filing of a case. All else equal, more experienced judges have the advantage of being able to resolve cases and mediate disputes using accumulated on-the-job skills and thus at a faster pace (see, e.g., Teitelbaum 2006, Choi et al 2009Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2012). We expect that, in comparison with cases adjudicated by less experienced judges, cases adjudicated by more experienced judges ceteris paribus take less time to both settlement and trial judgment.…”

The Duration of Judicial Deliberation: Evidence from Belgium

“…Accordingly, scholars in law and economics have empirically examined a wide range of court and judicial outcomes. These include, among others, judge productivity (e.g., Choi et al 2009, Ramseyer 2012, DimitrovaGrajzl et al 2012b, court efficiency (e.g., Deyneli 2012, Ippoliti et al 2014, the volume and mode of case disposition (e.g., Beenstock andHaitovsky 2004, Rosales-López 2008;DimitrovaGrajzl et al 2012aDimitrovaGrajzl et al , 2014El Bialy 2016, Galanter 2004, as well as the overall duration of litigation (e.g., Spurr 1997, Djankov et al 2003, Di Vita 2012, Boyd and Hoffman 2013, Bielen et al 2014. 1 By offering an empirically-grounded understanding of the judiciary, the literature's findings serve as an important input into the ongoing debate about the appropriate course of judicial reform (see, e.g., Botero et al 2003).…”

“…More experienced judges may be able to resolve cases with greater skill and speed (see, e.g., Teitelbaum 2006, Choi et al 2009Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2012b). Accordingly, we hypothesize (Hypothesis 12) that judicial deliberation is completed faster when the case is adjudicated by a judge with longer judicial experience.…”