Are Market GM Plants an Unrecognized Platform for Bioterrorism and Biocrime?

Abstract

This article discusses a previously unrecognized avenue for bioterrorism and biocrime. It is suggested that new gene editing technologies may have the potential to create plants that are genetically modified in harmful ways, either in terms of their effect on the plant itself or in terms of harming those who would consume foods produced by that plant. While several risk scenarios involving GMOs—such as antibiotic resistant pathogens, synthetic biology, or mixing of non-GMO seeds with GMO seeds—have previously have been recognized, the new vulnerability is rooted in a different paradigm—that of clandestinely manipulating GMOs to create damage. The ability to actively inflict diseases on plants would pose serious health hazards to both humans and animals, have detrimental consequences to the economy, and directly threaten the food supply. As this is the first study of this kind, the full scope and impact of suck attacks—especially those involving the intended misuse of technologies such as gene-drives—merits further investigation. Herein, the plausibility of some of the new risks will be analyzed by, (1) Highlighting ownership and origination issues (esp. of event-specific GM-plants) as unrecognized risk factors; (2) Investigating the unique role of GMOs, why—and how—certified GMOs could become a new venue for such attacks; (3) Analyzing possible dual-use potentials of modern technologies and research oriented toward the advancement of GMOs, plant breeding and crop improvement. The identification and analysis of harmful genetic manipulations to utilize (covertly modified) plants (GMOs and non-GMOs) as an attack vector show that these concerns need to be taken seriously, raising the prospect not only of direct harm, but of the more likely effects in generating public concern, reputational harm of agricultural biotechnology companies, law-suits, and increased import bans of certain plants or their derived products.

Facing the 2020 pandemic: What does cyberbiosecurity want us to know to safeguard the future?

“… CP “attackers may cause sensors to report false data or modify algorithms in control systems in ways that can jeopardize product quality, damage manufacturing equipment, and potentially induce occupational hazards.” [ 23 ] CP Regarding “smart labs” of the future: “adjustment of fan speeds in building ventilation systems… can lead to potential exposure of any building occupant to infectious microorganisms or their toxic products, contamination of the facility, or airborne release of pathogens to the surrounding external environment… changes to chemical concentration and/or holding time in liquid effluent decontamination systems which can result in premature discharge of infectious, toxic byproducts or genetically altered microorganisms to the municipal waste stream.” [ 21 ] CP “To obscure the identity and/or functional properties of the final product several biofoundries can be used, each synthesizing seemingly innocuous products representing only a portion of the final product.” [ 5 ] G, U Food, Agriculture, Water “The health and security… of agriculture and food systems is unclear from a cyberbiosecurity perspective. We reason that vulnerable critical links and nodes exist throughout this highly complex global and national ecosystem.” [ 39 ] V “a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al, 2017) in Europe could have been - or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures.” “DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms.” [ 14 ] CP,G “The identification and analysis of harmful genetic manipulations to utilize (covertly modified) plants (GMOs and non-GMOs) as an attack vector show that these concerns need to be taken seriously, raising the prospect not only of direct harm, but of the more likely effects in generating public concern, reputational harm of agricultural biotechnology companies, law-suits, and increased import bans of certain plants or their derived products.” [ 40 ] CP,G,U Water security exemplified via harmful algal blooms (HAB): “it is imperative to envision water security from the perspective of a cyber-physical system (CPS).” Attacks on HAB-monitoring systems include “data injection attacks, automated system hijacking attacks, node forgery attacks, and attacks on learning algorithms.” [ 68 ] CP a For the citations within quotations, please see the citing literature for details. …”

“…We reason that vulnerable critical links and nodes exist throughout this highly complex global and national ecosystem.” [ 39 ] V “a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al, 2017) in Europe could have been - or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures.” “DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms.” [ 14 ] CP,G “The identification and analysis of harmful genetic manipulations to utilize (covertly modified) plants (GMOs and non-GMOs) as an attack vector show that these concerns need to be taken seriously, raising the prospect not only of direct harm, but of the more likely effects in generating public concern, reputational harm of agricultural biotechnology companies, law-suits, and increased import bans of certain plants or their derived products.” [ 40 ] CP,G,U Water security exemplified via harmful algal blooms (HAB): “it is imperative to envision water security from the perspective of a cyber-physical system (CPS).” Attacks on HAB-monitoring systems include “data injection attacks, automated system hijacking attacks, node forgery attacks, and attacks on learning algorithms.” [ 68 ] CP a For the citations within quotations, please see the citing literature for details. b C-cyber, CP-cyberphysical, G-gap between digital and physical description/entity/process ( Section 5.2 ), V-various, U-unique concerns (e.g., due to ‘biologic information,’ Section 4.1 ; see also [ 40 ]). …”

“… b C-cyber, CP-cyberphysical, G-gap between digital and physical description/entity/process ( Section 5.2 ), V-various, U-unique concerns (e.g., due to ‘biologic information,’ Section 4.1 ; see also [ 40 ]). …”

“… The problem of identifying what needs to be protected: Many of the novel cyberbio risks and threats ( Table 1 ) have not been fully scoped. They are difficult to characterize, and envisioning the complete risk landscape continues to be a challenge [ 8 , 14 , 23 , 39 , 40 ]. Identifying and hierarchizing the extent, impact and severity of various (including, hypothetical) new vulnerabilities is difficult.…”

“… There is no comprehensive model to effectively capture, assess, and address the motivations, capabilities, and approaches of those who may cause harm (see also Section 4.2 ). How protection is achieved and enforced: Existing solutions from the cyber domain are only geared at specific aspects of biosecurity and cybersecurity but do not address the overlap and the issues arising from this convergence [ 8 , 14 , 40 ]. Due to variations in types of threats, targets and potential impacts, it is not straightforward to determine the applicability and effectiveness of a possible solution.…”