Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?

Abstract

The concept of well-being is increasingly gaining acceptance as an object of science, and many different types of well-being measures have been developed. A debate has emerged about which measures are able to capture well-being successfully. An important underlying problem is that there is no unified conceptual framework about the nature of well-being—a hotly debated topic of philosophical discussion. I argue that while there is little agreement about the nature of well-being in philosophy, there is an important agreement on some important principles relevant for its measurement. I argue that well-being science has good reasons to accommodate these principles, but currently fails to do so.

Nomadic Concepts, Variable Choice, and the Social Sciences

“…van der Deijl (2017, 210) writes that parts of the debate about wellbeing are characterized by “deep conceptual disagreement on the nature of wellbeing.” This appears to be the case here. For Hausman, wellbeing is an inferior variable, while for Alexandrova, we can use different notions of wellbeing as variables in specific situations.…”

Measuring subjective well-being for policy purposes: The example of well-being indicators in the WHO “Health 2020” framework

“…As is evident from the preceding discussion, the concept of well-being can be defined in rather different ways. How one decides to measure well-being will depend on how well-being is conceptualized in the first place [46]. the lacking conceptual clarity is not purely an academic concern.…”

A Reformed Division of Labor for the Science of Well-Being

“…First, theory-based approaches (henceforth, TBAs) prescribe a sharp division of labor whereby philosophers should provide general theories of well-being, whereas empirical scientists should develop measures of well-being grounded on philosophers’ theories (e.g. Hassoun, 2019; Sumner, 1996; Van der Deijl, 2017a). Second, evidence-based approaches (henceforth, EBAs) hold that the science of well-being should be grounded on ‘direct measures’ of well-being and take ‘as a prime objective the quantitative study of the determinants of well-being’ (Layard, 2010, p. 535; also Frijters et al, 2020; Seaford, 2011).…”