Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act

Ansolabehere, Stephen; Snyder, James M.; Tripathi, Micky

doi:10.1080/1369525022000015586

Cited by 194 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These shortcomings can be dealt with by utilizing the fact that the majority of PAC contributions come from interest groups who also lobby and the majority of lobbying expenditures accrue from interest groups who also give PAC contributions (Ansolabehere et al (2002), Lake (2015). As such, most political money comes from 'groups'for which the data contains (i) their contributions given to individual represen- …”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade

Lake

Millimet

2016

Journal of International Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Even if free trade creates net welfare gains for a country as a whole, the associated distributional implications can undermine the political viability of free trade. We show that trade-related redistributionas presently constituted -modestly increases the political viability of free trade in the US. We do so by assessing the causal e¤ect of expected redistribution associated with the US Trade Adjustment Assistance program on US Congressional voting behavior on eleven Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between 2003 and 2011. We …nd that a one standard deviation increase in expected redistribution leads to an average increase in the probability of voting in favor of an FTA of 1.8 percentage points. Although this is a modest impact on average, we …nd signi…cant heterogeneities; in particular, the e¤ect is larger when a representative's constituents are more at risk or the representative faces greater re-election risk.JEL: F13, H50, J65

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade

Lake

Millimet

2016

Journal of International Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Effect (iii) is hard to distinguish empirically from effect (ii), but many studies have nevertheless tried to assess the impact of a given candidate spatial position on the contributions raised (Poole and Romer, 1985;Poole, Romer and Rosenthal, 1987;McCarty and Poole,1998). Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi (2002) and references therein discuss effect (iv) 13 .…”

Section: Relation To Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress

Bombardini

Trebbi

2011

Journal of Public Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group's campaign contributions to politicians. We uncover a robust hump-shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator. This pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician (thereby increasing contributions), but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds (thereby decreasing contributions). The model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and PAC donations and local employment by sector. This procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups. Our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes: we find that an additional vote costs a politician on average 145 dollars. JEL Classification codes: D72, P48, H7Acknowledgements: the authors would like to thank

show abstract

“…Most of the current debate on the role of outside spending revolves around two themes: (i) whether corporations and unions' rights and policy interest coincide with-or at least deserve the same protection as-those of American citizens' (see, for example, Justice Steven's dissenting opinion on Citizens United v. FEC ) and (ii) whether outside spending is really uncoordinated, rather than a vehicle to circumvent existing regulation (Ansolabehere et al, 2002;Heineman, 2012). Few studies examine the impact of outside spending under the assumptions that it provides useful policy information to the electorate.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%