2019
DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12634
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Are Presidential Inversions Inevitable? Comparing Eight Counterfactual Rules for Electing the U.S. President*

Abstract: Objectives. We offer a typology of possible reforms to the Electoral College (EC) in terms of changes to its two most important structural features: seat allocations that are not directly proportional to population and winner-take-all outcomes at the state level. This typology allows us to classify four major variants of "reform" to the present EC in a parsimonious fashion. Many of the proposals we consider have been suggested by well-known figures, some debated in Congress, and they include what we view as mo… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1

Citation Types

0
11
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
1
1

Relationship

3
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 23 publications
(11 citation statements)
references
References 29 publications
0
11
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Nevertheless, even the strongest defender of the Electoral College will have to acknowledge that selecting the wrong winner is the worst possible outcome, eroding the legitimacy and the democratic support for the institution. However, as Cervas and Grofman (2019) make clear in their review, all current proposals are difficult to implement and still entail the risk that a candidate who did not win the popular vote would be elected as president of the United States. Further, the current system provides very specific incentives to presidential candidates and some states are especially attached to this incentive structure (Cervas & Grofman, 2017).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, even the strongest defender of the Electoral College will have to acknowledge that selecting the wrong winner is the worst possible outcome, eroding the legitimacy and the democratic support for the institution. However, as Cervas and Grofman (2019) make clear in their review, all current proposals are difficult to implement and still entail the risk that a candidate who did not win the popular vote would be elected as president of the United States. Further, the current system provides very specific incentives to presidential candidates and some states are especially attached to this incentive structure (Cervas & Grofman, 2017).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition to the partisan distribution of voters across states, turnout differences among the states may also operate to bias outcome to create a discrepancy between the popular vote winner and the EC winner. These election‐specific effects can be substantial enough to generate a partisan bias that can lead to a divergence between popular vote majority winner and the winner of the EC vote (Cervas and Grofman, 2019). Calculations of this bias suggest that it has sometimes favored Democrats and sometimes favored Republicans, but with a large pro‐Republican bias in 2016 (Grofman, Koetzle, and Brunell, 1997; Pattie and Johnston, 2014; Zingher, 2016).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, even if minor-party candidates did not change the presidential election outcome in 2016 Kopko 2016, 2021), can we state the same for 2020? Unlike the election in 2016, the 2020 election did not exhibit an Electoral College inversion of the popular vote (Cervas and Grofman 2019). Nonetheless, despite Joe Biden having won the national popular vote by more than seven million votes, the outcome was very close in many states-as it was in 2016-including the pivotal states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.…”
mentioning
confidence: 86%