Are profit-maximisers the best survivors?

Schaffer, Mark E.

doi:10.1016/0167-2681(89)90075-9

Cited by 185 publications

(87 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Otherwise, at least one mutation will be optimal to imitate, and it will diffuse. As observed by Schaffer (1989), a strategy profile may be m-stable with homogenous mutants (e.g. mutations in the same direction) but unstable with heterogenous mutations.…”

Section: The Case Of M Heterogenous Mutationsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…(Schaffer (1989), Vega-Redondo (1997)) In a finite population oligopoly game, the only ESS is the Walrasian equilibrium strategy.…”

Section: Ess and Nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The mechanism that pushes the population towards the Walrasian equilibrium is well documented in evolutionary literature, and its relation with the spite effect has been established by Schaffer (1989). Hamilton (1970Hamilton ( ,1971 defines spiteful behavior as the capacity of an animal to harm both itself and another, and gain an evolutionary advantage if the harm on the other animal is greater than the self-harm.…”

Section: Evolutionary Stability Of Equilibrium and The Spite Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is why this configuration is studied in the literature under more specific selection mechanisms, the second part of the article will consider such a mechanism. The last part of section 3 will also establish the relationship between ESS, spite effect, and maximization of relative payoffs, following Schaffer (1989), and Bergin & Bernhardt (2004).…”

Section: Evolutionary Stability Of Equilibrium and The Spite Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following Schaffer (1989) and Bergin & Bernhardt (2004), we can reformulate the relation between spite effect and the ESS on the basis of relative payoffs of firms. This will also allow us to introduce the fitness concept that is central to the evolutionary learning mechanisms.…”

Section: The Case Of M Heterogenous Mutationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Convergence in the finite Cournot oligopoly with social and individual learning

Vallée

Yıldızoğlu

2009

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Convergence to the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly is a question that recurrently arises as a subject of controversy in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics, and the evolutionary stability of the equilibria of the Cournot game has been extensively studied in the literature. Several articles show that the Walrasian equilibrium is the stable ESS of the Cournot game. But no general result has been established for the difficult case of simultaneous heterogenous mutations. Authors propose specific selection dynamics to analyze this case. Vriend (2000) proposes using a genetic algorithm for studying learning dynamics in this game and obtains convergence to Cournot equilibrium with individual learning. The resulting convergence has been questioned by Arifovic and Maschek (2006). The aim of this article is to clarify this controversy: it analyzes the mechanisms that are behind these contradictory results and underlines the specific role of the spite effect. We show why social learning gives rise to the Walrasian equilibrium and why, in a general setup, individual learning can effectively yield convergence to the Cournot equilibrium. We also illustrate these general results by systematic computational experiments. JEL codes: L130; L200; D430; C630; C730.

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Section: The Case Of M Heterogenous Mutationsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…(Schaffer (1989), Vega-Redondo (1997)) In a finite population oligopoly game, the only ESS is the Walrasian equilibrium strategy.…”

Section: Ess and Nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Evolutionary Stability Of Equilibrium and The Spite Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Evolutionary Stability Of Equilibrium and The Spite Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Case Of M Heterogenous Mutationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Convergence in the finite Cournot oligopoly with social and individual learning

Vallée

Yıldızoğlu

2009

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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The manufacturer's quality‐improvement decisions and evolutionary stable strategy of retailers' marketing objectives under network externality

Sun,

Yi,

Yang

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

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To analyze the influence of network externality (NE) and bargaining power of retailers on the quality‐improvement decisions of the manufacturer, evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of retailers' marketing objectives, and profits of retailers and the manufacturer, we developed an evolutionary game model of supply chain composed of a monopoly manufacturer and one population of retailers under NE. We found that the retailers' ESS is influenced by both NE and product quality‐improvement levels. With the improvement of NE or product quality‐improvement levels, the marketing objectives of retailers will experience three evolutionary stable states: profit maximization, coexistence of profit maximization and revenue maximization, and revenue maximization. The product quality‐improvement levels and retailers' profits do not necessarily improve with the increase of NE, which depend on the retailers' ESS, but the manufacturer's profits always benefit from NE. When retailers' bargaining power reaches a certain level, it can influence the ESS of retailers' marketing objectives. Interestingly, the retailers' bargaining power does not necessarily enhance their own profits; it is related to the ESS of retailers' marketing objectives but consistently reduces the manufacturer's profits.

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