Are Psychopaths Legally Insane?

Abstract

The question of whether psychopaths are criminally and morally responsible has generated significant controversy in the literature. In this paper, we discuss what relevance a psychopathy diagnosis has for criminal responsibility. It has been argued that figuring out whether psychopathy is a mental illness is of fundamental importance, because it is a precondition for psychopaths’ eligibility to be excused via the legal insanity defense. But even if psychopathy counts as a mental illness, this alone is not sufficient to show the insanity defense is applicable; it must also be shown that, as a result of the illness, specific deficits in moral understanding or control are present. In this paper, we show that a diagnosis of psychopathy will generally not indicate that a defendant is eligible for an insanity defense. This is because the group of individuals subsumed under the diagnosis is so heterogeneous that while some psychopaths do show significant impairments in affect and control which may impact on their responsibility, many psychopaths are not incapacitated in a way relevant to responsibility.

Brain Pathology and Moral Responsibility

“…For the discussion about moral responsibility what matters is the relationship between brain difference and psychological dysfunction, not whether we call this difference dysfunctional at the level of the brain. But it is important to recognize that not all brain differences or defects will ground mental dysfunction, and some mental dysfunctions will not be relevant for responsibility, because they affect areas of cognition and perception which are not relevant to moral judgment and decision-making (Jefferson and Sifferd 2018).…”

“…problems with impulse control or empathic deficits. For example, brain differences might be evidence for executive function problems, and this might be relevant for moral responsibility because an agent's ability to control their reactions or to attend to morally salient features of a situation 3 For detailed defences of the claim that we cannot simply move from a psychiatric diagnosis to a verdict on moral responsibility, see (King and May 2018) and (Jefferson and Sifferd 2018). are implicated (for example, in the context of autism or psychopathy).…”

The Societal Response to Psychopathy in the Community

“…There are different normative investigations on how laws and ethical recommendations should apply to individuals with psychopathy. The bulk of the debate concerns whether these individuals should be held morally (e.g., Levy, 2007; Malatesti & McMillan, 2010; Shoemaker, 2011) or legally responsible (e.g., Glenn, Raine, et al, 2011; Jefferson & Sifferd, 2018; Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018a; Kiehl & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013; Morse, 2008), and whether they are afflicted by a mental disorder (e.g., Jurjako, 2019; Krupp et al, 2012; Malatesti, 2014; Nadelhoffer & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). If empirical evidence warrants that offenders with psychopathy are not morally or legally responsible, then punishment or other social penalties would not be appropriate for them (cf.…”

“…If empirical evidence warrants that offenders with psychopathy are not morally or legally responsible, then punishment or other social penalties would not be appropriate for them (cf. Jefferson & Sifferd, 2018; Nadelhoffer & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Similarly, if individuals with excessive levels of psychopathy are mentally disordered, then we would be morally justified in treating them in psychiatric institutions.…”

Biocognitive Classification of Antisocial Individuals Without Explanatory Reductionism

“…Currently, there is a scarcity of therapies that significantly reduce antisocial behavior among vulnerable groups, such as those comprising individuals diagnosed with psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder (Brazil, van Dongen, Maes, Mars, & Baskin-Sommers, 2018; Ogloff & Wood, 2010; Salekin, Worley, & Grimes, 2010). Likewise, how to judge the crimes of the offenders affected by these conditions and effectively managing them in different institutional settings offers serious challenges (Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery, 2012; DeLisi, 2016; Glenn, Raine, & Laufer, 2011; Jefferson & Sifferd, 2018; Jurjako and Malatesti, 2018a; Yang, Glenn, & Raine, 2008).…”