Are sense-specific reference frames so mutually exclusive?

Sauvan, Xavier M.

doi:10.1017/s0140525x99001831

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Hence, no inferential theorist assumes that motion perception is sense-specific (see Wertheim 1999, for a more detailed analysis of this issue). Nor do vestibular researchers -who, for decades now, are trying to unravel the way how retinal, somatosensory, and vestibular afferents interact to bring about particular percepts of self-motion -assume that motion perception (of any kind) is sensory-specific (see e.g., Sauvan 1999). On the contrary, these sensory interactions are their core business, both on the perceptual and on the neurophysiological level.…”

Section: Motionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy, information, detection, and action

Michaels

Oudejans

2001

Behav Brain Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Motionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy, information, detection, and action

Michaels

Oudejans

2001

Behav Brain Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

On specification and the senses

2001

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this target article we question the assumption that perception is divided into separate domains of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. We review implications of this assumption for theories of perception and for our understanding of ambient energy arrays (e.g., the optic and acoustic arrays) that are available to perceptual systems. We analyze three hypotheses about relations between ambient arrays and physical reality: (1) that there is an ambiguous relation between ambient energy arrays and physical reality, (2) that there is a unique relation between individual energy arrays and physical reality, and (3) that there is a redundant but unambiguous relation, within or across arrays, between energy arrays and physical reality. This is followed by a review of the physics of motion, focusing on the existence and status of referents for physical motion. Our review indicates that it is not possible, in principle, for there to be a unique relation between physical motion and the structure of individual energy arrays. We argue that physical motion relative to different referents is specified only in the global array, which consists of higher-order relations across different forms of energy. The existence of specificity in the global array is consistent with the idea of direct perception, and so poses a challenge to traditional, inference-based theories of perception and cognition. However, it also presents a challenge to much of the ecological approach to perception and action, which has accepted the assumption of separate senses.

show abstract