Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen?

Sechser, Todd S.

doi:10.1177/0022002704268025

Cited by 69 publications

(47 citation statements)

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“…The data also reveal that states ruled by military governments are no more mechanized than other states, contrary to the received wisdom that militaries prefer expensive, capital-intensive procurement policies. The propensity for states with weak civilian control of the military to initiate international conflicts (Sechser 2004) therefore probably cannot be explained by systematic differences in military force structure.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A related argument suggests that militaries prefer offensive doctrines and the expensive weapons that underpin those doctrines (Posen 1984:47-50). Sechser (2004), for example, finds that military governments are more likely to initiate militarized conflicts than civilian regimes; higher mechanization levels and the offensive doctrines they support could help explain this finding.…”

Section: Domestic Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001

Sechser

Saunders

2010

International Studies Quarterly

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Recent research suggests that a crucial factor in understanding the outcomes of military conflicts is the extent to which militaries are mechanized-that is, their relative dependence on tanks and armored vehicles compared to manpower. Since World War II, militaries have become increasingly mechanized both among the great powers and in unexpected quarters of the developing world. Yet the extent of military mechanization varies widely across states. Why have some states adopted highly mechanized force structures, while others have not? This paper tests several hypotheses about the determinants of military mechanization. One perspective suggests that strategic factors-including the force structures of adversaries and neighbors, recent combat lessons, and internal insurgency threats-shape a military's mix of manpower and vehicles. A second set of hypotheses points instead to domestic institutions such as democracy and civilian control of the military. Still other theories emphasize economic forces and international norms. To test these and other hypotheses, we construct a new data set containing mechanization rates for more than 150 militaries from 1979 to 2001. Broadly, we find significant support for the strategic perspective and little support for domestic institutional explanations. In addition, the results suggest systematic and predictable differences in the ways states structure their militaries in response to security pressures.Often overlooked in the political debate surrounding the 2007 ''surge'' of US troops into Iraq was the shift in military doctrine that accompanied it. After nearly four years of struggle in Iraq, the US military began to abandon its Authors' notes: The order of the authors is random and reflects equal contributions. For helpful comments on previous drafts, the authors thank

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Domestic Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001

Sechser

Saunders

2010

International Studies Quarterly

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“…Other literature in political science suggests that leaders who served in the military or in combat may have hawkish views regarding military engagement (see Geddes, 1999Geddes, , 2003Holsti, 2001;Horowitz and Stam, 2014). Sechser (2004) argues that military conservatism may simply be a by-product of civilian oversight. Views of citizens and political leaders on military issues are typically measured with surveys (see, e.g., Holsti, 1998).…”

Section: Related Literature and Theoretical Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Military careers of politicians matter for national security policy

Stadelmann

Portmann

Eichenberger

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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a b s t r a c tDo politicians with a military background vote differently on military affairs? We investigate the informative institutional setting of the Swiss conscription army. Politicians who served in the military have a higher probability of accepting pro-military legislative proposals, even when controlling for party affiliations and the revealed preferences of their constituents. Although conscription requires all able-bodied man to serve at least as soldiers, we can exploit variation in exposure to enforced and voluntary service. We find evidence that intrinsic motivation to serve in the military, instead of compulsory service, plays a substantial role in explaining legislative decisions on military affairs.

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“…This argument leads to a similar conclusion -albeit through a different causal mechanism -asSechser (2004). For a contrary perspective, seeHuntington (1957);Feaver and Gelpi (2005).…”

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confidence: 81%

Resolve in International Politics

Kertzer¹

2016

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Why do some leaders and segments of the public display remarkable persistence in confrontations in international politics, while others cut and run? The answer given by policymakers, pundits, and political scientists usually relates to issues of resolve. Yet, though we rely on resolve to explain almost every phenomenon in international politics—from prevailing at the bargaining table to winning on the battlefield—we don't understand what it is, how it works, or where it comes from. This book draws on a growing body of research in psychology and behavioral economics to explore the foundations of this important idea. It argues that political will is more than just a metaphor or figure of speech: the same traits that social scientists and decision-making scholars use to comprehend willpower in our daily lives also shape how we respond to the costs of war and conflict. The book shows how time and risk preferences, honor orientation, and self-control help explain the ways by which leaders and members of the public define the situations they face and weigh the trade-offs between the costs of fighting and the costs of backing down. Offering a novel in-depth look at how willpower functions in international relations, the book has critical implications for understanding political psychology, public opinion about foreign policy, leaders in military interventions, and international security.

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Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen?

Cited by 69 publications

References 46 publications

The Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001

The Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001

Military careers of politicians matter for national security policy

Resolve in International Politics

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