2017
DOI: 10.1111/nous.12204
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Are The Statue and The Clay Mutual Parts?

Abstract: Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.

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Cited by 15 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Nothing of substance turns on these assumptions. (But see Walters (2019) and Goodman (MS) for recent defences of anti-symmetry. )…”
Section: Parthoodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nothing of substance turns on these assumptions. (But see Walters (2019) and Goodman (MS) for recent defences of anti-symmetry. )…”
Section: Parthoodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Note that Simons favours a non-extensional mereology.) Similarly, Walters (2017) argues that symmetric parthood is not really a proper parthood relation.…”
Section: A Neutral Basismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But, first, it is not at all obvious that colocated objects have the same parts. For example, the head of a statue is definitely a part of the statue but, pre-theoretically, it would not count as part of the marble (see [1, p. 81], [48] and [50] inter alia). Second, this response makes the argument for coincidence circular.…”
Section: No Interpenetration As An Anti-colocation Principlementioning
confidence: 99%