Are the Supporters of Populist Parties Loyal Voters? Dissatisfaction and Stable Voting for Populist Parties

Abstract

Scholars of electoral behaviour regularly link political dissatisfaction to two types of behaviour: voting for populist parties and unstable voting behaviour. It is therefore not surprising that the electorates of populist parties are generally assumed to be rather volatile. In this article, we argue that this is not necessarily the case – in particular in a context of increasingly strong and viable populist parties. We make use of data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project to show that voters for populist parties are neither more nor less volatile than voters for mainstream parties. Political dissatisfaction among voters for populist parties even increases the likelihood of stable voting for populist parties. The supply of populist parties further conditions the stability of the populist vote, as voters in systems with established populist parties are more likely to vote stably for populist parties. Finally, we find that in a context of strong and stable populist parties, the effect of political satisfaction on vote switching is somewhat reduced.

The more the better? Cumulative issue ownership and intra-campaign party switching

“…Political disaffection, as measured by distrust in institutions or parties, dissatisfaction with democracy, or lack of external efficacy is another driver of party switch (Zelle, 1995). Dissatisfied voters "lack incentives to form stable party preferences" (Voogd and Dassonneville, 2018: 3) and tend to use party switch to punish incumbent parties. While dissatisfaction with democracy and political alienation primarily translate into vote switching between elections (Dassonneville, 2012;;Dassonneville and Dejaeghere, 2014), within campaign switchers also display lower levels of efficacy (Dassonneville, 2012).…”

Where is the middle? Considering the socio-political centre in Germany

“…The range of contestants and voter variability is increasing. As allegiance to traditional 'mainstream' parties weakens, the stable populist voter emerges as a paradoxical feature (Voogd & Dassonneville, 2020).…”

Putting ‘political’ back in political trust: an IRT test of the unidimensionality and cross-national equivalence of political trust measures

“…Cross-national research has therefore focused on political trust and its causes (e.g. Esaiasson 2011; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; Bargsted et al 2017), correlates (e.g., Voogd and Dassonneville 2018;Choi and Kwon 2019), and supposed crisis (e.g., Norris 2011;Van Erkel and Van der Meer 2016). This empirical literature on political trust builds on widely shared assumptions that trust is unidimensional as well as cross-nationally equivalent.…”