Are Three Points for a Win Really Better than Two? Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for German Soccer

Dilger, Alexander; Geyer, Hannah

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1155173

Cited by 20 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In each, the incentives are obviously different due to a different reward system: in league games, the three points for a win and one point for a draw system arguably lead to less caution and more attacking play than in playoffs. This is consistent with the recent contribution of Dilger and Geyer's (2009) natural experiment comparing German League and Cup games (in a style similar to the framework advocated here) and is confirmed by the statistics in our data set. The average number of goals in regulation time of playoff games is 0.79 for home teams and 0.63 for away teams, whereas in league games the respective numbers are 1.44 and 1.04.…”

Section: Estimated Marginal Effects Of the Overall Scoring Section Fosupporting

confidence: 93%

Policy Timing and Footballers' Incentives

Lenten

Libich

Stehlı́k

2012

Journal of Sports Economics

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Assessing the effect of the timing and sequencing of various policy regimes on optimizing agent behavior is both important and difficult. To offer some insights, this article examines a timing decision from sports. The penalty shootout in football (soccer) has long been seen as problematic, among other reasons because it creates incentives for excessively cautious play during extra time. One proposal to alleviate this has been to alter the timing, and stage the shootout before (rather than after) extra time with the result binding only if the subsequent extra time offers no resolution. Carrillo's (2007) theoretical model shows that since the effect of this rule change is ambiguous in theory, the proposal's desirability needs to be assessed empirically. Using a comprehensive match data set, the authors compare scoring outcomes of various treatment and control groups, whereby the former simulate closely players' incentives from the proposed rule change, and the latter represent the current timing. Most importantly, the authors examine how extra time scoring probabilities depend on a goal being scored in the first 5 (or 15) min of extra time. Their estimates suggest that bringing the shootout before extra time would substantially alter the players' incentives in extra time and produce more overall attacking play. Quantitatively, the rule change is predicted to increase the odds of extra time scoring about threefold. Specifically, for the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA club competitions, the probability of scoring in extra time is estimated to increase on average by 45-60%, depending on various factors such as the result in regulation time, balancedness of the teams, and home ground advantage. In summary, all these results suggest that the case for trialing the proposed rule is strong. More generally, they highlight the incentive channels through which sequencing of policies may determine their effectiveness.

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Section: Estimated Marginal Effects Of the Overall Scoring Section Fosupporting

confidence: 93%

Policy Timing and Footballers' Incentives

Lenten

Libich

Stehlı́k

2012

Journal of Sports Economics

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“…In contrast, Dilger and Geyer (2009) considered the pattern of German football, crucially using Cup football as a control so as to discount changes that were happening anyway, and concluded to a high level of significance that the change had brought about a decrease in the number of draws and an increase in the number of victories by just one goal. It would be interesting to know how the use of controls could have affected the two studies mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs.…”

Section: The Three-point Rule In Footballmentioning

confidence: 99%

OR analysis of sporting rules – A survey

Wright

2014

European Journal of Operational Research

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This paper surveys the academic OR/analytics literature describing research into the laws and rules of sports and sporting competitions. The literature is divided into post hoc analyses and proposals for future changes, and is also divided into laws/rules of sports themselves and rules/organisation of tournaments or competitions.The survey outlines a large number of studies covering 21 sports in many parts of the world. The analytical approaches most commonly used are found to be various forms of regression analysis and simulation. Issues highlighted by this survey include the different views of what constitutes fairness and the frequency with which changes produce unintended consequences.

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“…While they do not find evidence that the three-point rule impacted on the proportion of tied games, they support the more general prediction of Longley and Sankaran (2007) that not all teams will adopt the same strategy after rule introduction. Inquiring into the German situation Dilger and Geyer (2009) deliver empirical evidence that the fraction of games ending in a tie significantly decreased after the introduction of the three-point rule in Germany. After developing a theoretical model predicting that the proportion of tied games should decline with the introduction of a three-point rule in football, Moschini (2010) finds empirical support for this prediction based on data from 35 countries.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

One for Sure or Maybe Three

Franck¹,

Theiler²

2012

Sports Economics: Present and Future Impact on General Economics

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In order to avoid too many tied games after playing the five-minute overtime period, the National Hockey League (NHL) introduced two rule changes in the 1999-2000 season. First, a team that loses in overtime receives one point instead of zero points. Second, the number of skaters in overtime is reduced from five to four. The theoretical literature analyzing these rule changes predicted that they would also produce the unintended side-effect that more games would reach overtime and recommended that a team that wins in regulation should receive three points (instead of two) in order to counterbalance the converse effect. We are the first to empirically support this theoretical prediction using NHL data and data from Swiss ice hockey, in which the rule changes of the NHL were copied in the 2006-2007 season and in which the three-point rule was also introduced. SummaryIn order to avoid too many tied games after playing the five-minute overtime period, the National Hockey League (NHL) introduced two rule changes in the 1999-2000 season. First, a team that loses in overtime receives one point instead of zero points. Second, the number of skaters in overtime is reduced from five to four. The theoretical literature analyzing these rule changes predicted that they would also produce the unintended side-effect that more games would reach overtime and recommended that a team that wins in regulation should receive three points (instead of two) in order to counterbalance the converse effect. We are the first to empirically support this theoretical prediction using NHL data and data from Swiss ice hockey, in which the rule changes of the NHL were copied in the 2006-2007 season and in which the three-point rule was also introduced.

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Are Three Points for a Win Really Better than Two? Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for German Soccer

Cited by 20 publications

References 8 publications

Policy Timing and Footballers' Incentives

Policy Timing and Footballers' Incentives

OR analysis of sporting rules – A survey

One for Sure or Maybe Three

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