Are Two Carrots Better Than One? The Effects of Adding Employment Services to Financial Incentive Programs for Welfare Recipients

Robins, Philip K.; Michalopoulos, Charles; Foley, Kelly

doi:10.1177/001979390806100308

“…Certain studies have tried to test the variants of programs to see which combination was best. 20 Robins et al (2008), for example, tested a variant of the SSP (SSP+), where extra income was combined with access to job search assistance. The experiment incorporated three groups: a control group, a group enrolled in the SSP, and a group in SSP+.…”

Section: Signaling or Gains In Productivity For Programs Of Employmementioning

confidence: 99%

Active Labor Market Policies

Crépon

¹

,

Berg

²

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents inIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 10321 October 2016 ABSTRACTActive Labor Market Policies * Active labor market policies are massively used with the objective being to improve labor market outcomes of individuals out of work. Many observational evaluation studies have been published. In this review, we critically assess policy effectiveness. We emphasize insights from recent randomized controlled trials. In addition, we examine policy effects that have not been the primary object of most of the past evaluations, such as anticipatory effects of advance knowledge of future treatments and equilibrium effects, and we discuss the actual implementation of policies. We discuss the importance of heterogeneity of programs and effects and examine the extent to which potential participants are interested in enrollment.We also discuss the assessment of costs and benefits of programs.JEL Classification: J08, J64

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“…The effects on American dislocated workers might be similar to the effects on Canadian welfare recipients who benefitted from the provision of additional employment services in addition to an earnings supplement in the SSP Plus component of the Self-Sufficiency Project (Robins et al 2008). In the United States, job search assistance services could be added to the offer of a wage supplement.…”

Section: Experimental Evaluation Of Wage Supplements For All Dislocatmentioning

confidence: 91%

Wage Insurance as a Policy Option in the United States

Wandner

¹

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in ABSTRACTWage insurance is a program that attempts to help permanently displaced workers transition to employment rapidly, effectively, and equitably. Because displaced workers have been found to suffer substantial earnings losses when they become reemployed, a wage insurance program provides a temporary wage supplement that partially reduces the wage loss experienced by targeted, newly reemployed workers. While participating workers receive a "wage supplement," the program is called "wage insurance" because of its design as a social insurance program rather than an income transfer program. This paper provides a discussion of the development of wage insurance as a policy option in the United States and proposals that have had varying goals and designs. JEL Classification Codes: J65, J68

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“…SSP Plus, a programme for single-parent welfare recipients in Canada, found sustained effects that exceeded those from regular SSP that provided earnings supplements alone (Robins et al, 2008). The additional impact relative to regular SSP was sizeable, with an increased employment rate averaging nearly 7 percentage points 36-52 months after randomisation.…”

Section: Experimental Evidence From Previous Programmes For Welfare Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of temporary in-work support on employment retention: Evidence from a field experiment

Dorsett

¹

2014

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A recent experimental programme for unemployed welfare recipients in the UK found that temporary earnings supplements combined with post-employment services led to a sustained rise in employment. This paper examines whether this was due to increases in employment entry or to reductions in employment exit. Using a hazard rate model, we find a significant effect on initial employment entry but not on subsequent transitions. The results also show that the length of a completed unemployment spell has a negative effect on the hazard of exit from the next unemployment spell. While the direct effect of the programme is to shorten the initial unemployment spell, an indirect effect arises due to this lagged duration dependence.

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Are Two Carrots Better Than One? The Effects of Adding Employment Services to Financial Incentive Programs for Welfare Recipients

Cited by 18 publications

References 4 publications

Active Labor Market Policies

Active Labor Market Policies

Wage Insurance as a Policy Option in the United States

The effect of temporary in-work support on employment retention: Evidence from a field experiment

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