Are we finished with the ethnophilosophy debate? A multi-perspective conversation

Abstract

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: (1) ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; (2) ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; (3) ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and (4) ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: (1) the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and (2) the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions.Keywords: Ethno, African philosophy, Foundationalist, Universalist, Particularist, The common moral position (CMP), Ethnophilosophy

The “ethnophilosophy” problem: How the idea of “social imaginaries” may remedy it

“…Perhaps it was meant to serve as a missionary handbook of sorts for future evangelizers that might presumably provide a rough guide into the “soul” of the African to facilitate the mission of evangelization and colonization. Matolino (2019: 116) reiterates this point when he finds in Bantu Philosophy an “intriguing combination of racism and colonial fawning … to aid the success of the colonial mission.”…”

“…Though Hountondji seems to be focusing on "political" relevance and sometimes on scientific, I believe the issue borders on overall capacity to address Africa's many challenges. Matolino (2019): 115-116), following Hountondji, also expresses doubts about the capacity of ethnophilosophy to contribute to a "rapidly changing African personae and environment" on grounds that "ethnophilosophy essentializes who and what the African standpoint is." Several other attributes of ethnophilosophy combine to undermine its capacity to speak to Africa's problems.…”

“…This, in turn, stems from the assumption that being “critical” and “analytical” must be defined in terms of the West. Edwin Etieyibo (2019) shares Mangena's positive disposition toward ethnophilosophy, insisting that it is “genuine philosophy.”…”

“…Drawing heavily on Hountondji's famous critique (which I shall painstakingly outline), Matolino notes that ethnophilosophy, together with its claims, were “invented” to advance racist and colonialist agenda, albeit in a subtle form. Matolino (2019: 116) uses so many uncomplimentary terms to describe ethnophilosophy, referring to it as “a disreputable trend in African philosophy” that has “continuously misrepresented the black person as lacking precise and clear logic.” In terms of societal relevance, he submits: “Weighed down by its essentialism, ethnophilosophy can never be relevant or useful for the African who either seeks to fix herself in her authentic roots or seeks a useful frame of reference in her theorization” (2019: 116). Coming out strongly against African scholars sympathetic to ethnophilosophy, he wonders why anyone would still think that anything good might come out of what he takes to be a fundamentally flawed scholarly agenda.…”

African Ethno-Ethics and Bioethical Principlism: Implication for the Othered Patient

“…A case in mind is the ethnophilosophy trend in African philosophy. Although there is a protracted debate in African philosophy on the extent and degree to which the ethno is relevant for African philosophy, its actual relevance is hardly in question (see Imafidon et al 2019). Therefore, I begin in the first section of this chapter by showing the importance of African ethos and ethno-ethics as wellspring for the theorising of African moral philosophy.…”