Are you a neoliberal subject? On the uses and abuses of a concept

Abstract

A spate of social scientific literature gives the impression that societies in the twenty-first century are overrun with ‘neoliberal subjects’. But what does it actually mean to be a neoliberal subject? And in what ways does this concept relate to ‘neoliberalism’, more generally? In this article, I distinguish between four common ways of thinking about ‘neoliberalism’: (1) as a set of economic policies, (2) as a hegemonic ideological project, (3) as a political rationality and form of governmentality and (4) as a specific type of embodied subjectivity. I argue that while neoliberalisms (1), (2) and (3) potentially hold clear conceptual connections to one another – notwithstanding the quite real tensions between them – their relationship to neoliberalism (4) is often (although not always) tenuous at best. That is, the evidence routinely offered to demonstrate the existence of neoliberalism (4) bears almost no necessary relationship to neoliberalisms (1), (2) or (3). I conclude that, for both academic and political reasons, scholars should be more careful when invoking the monolithic notion of a ‘neoliberal subject’.

The ‘narrow self’? Developing a critical‐historical work psychology

“…For example, it is difficult to address the concerns of the ‘manifesto for the future of work and organizational psychology’ (Bal et al, 2019), such as academic diversity, well‐being, the academic precariat, etc., unless we consider how the governance of universities relates to their broader socio‐economic context, especially the growth of neoliberal economics, technologies and practices (e.g. Bal & Dóci, 2018; Bröckling, 2016; Miller & Rose, 2008; Watts, 2021). This project requires an examination of the historical development of technique and practice so that we can position the psychological subject in their historical context.…”

“…Bal & Dóci, 2018; Islam & Sanderson, 2022). However, Watts (2021) has recently questioned the ease with which we can map the effects of neoliberalism on to subjectivity. As with other writers (e.g.…”

“…Bröckling, 2016; Flew, 2014; Shamir, 2008), he argues that there is no singular neoliberalism, because the term is used to variously refer to ‘a set of economic policies … a hegemonic ideological project and … a political rationality and form of governmentality’ (Watts, 2021, p. 2). Unlike other writers who complain that neoliberalism ‘has become an asphyxiating and enervating monolith’ (Welsh, 2020, p. 58), Watts (2021) is not seeking to deny its significance, but instead arguing that ‘neoliberalism is a coherent—if polyvalent —concept’ (p. 2, emphasis added) that consequently implies diverse relationships with subjectivities.…”

“…Yet even within such differentiation between these variable subjectivities, Watts still suggests that a range of questions remain. To take just one example, why is there anything ‘inherently “neoliberal” about the discourse of personal responsibility’ when a similar political discourse can be found with ‘conservative, communitarian, … social democratic projects’ (Watts, 2021, p. 9)?…”

“…Secondly, rather than ‘invoking the monolithic notion of a “neoliberal subject”’ (Watts, 2021, p. 16), we need to consider its ‘polyphony’ (Bröckling, 2016, p. 59), and the relationships between neoliberalism and subjectivity in a broad historical context. As Billig (2008) notes, even within critical psychology, ‘there is a tendency to provide somewhat shallow histories that do not lead much further back than the mid‐20th century’ (p. 22).…”