Are your patient’s medically unexplained symptoms really “all in her head”?

Thomas, Laurie Endicott

doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2012.01.031

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Physicians are often reluctant to tell their patients they have a psychogenic illness, perceiving that a psychogenic illness, perhaps because it is out of their treatment purview, "provides invalidation and erects barriers" to patient rapport. Finding a medical condition, by contrast, tells patients that their illness is genuine and significant, and even if the diagnosis does not alter the course of the patient's condition or improve the outcome it can provide psychological comfort (Thomas, 2012). This appears to be a rationalization for medicalizing psychological distress, iatrogenically shaping patient concerns to sustain medical attention and medical treatment.…”

Section: Forensic Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution, forensic implications, and future of somatic symptom disorders.

Hartman¹

2017

APA Handbook of Forensic Neuropsychology.

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Section: Forensic Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution, forensic implications, and future of somatic symptom disorders.

Hartman¹

2017

APA Handbook of Forensic Neuropsychology.

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“…This sort of theory accommodates considerable aetiological implications which are also considered as extremely problematic. Dealing with the endlessly disputed issue of the psyche-soma division from the outset of psychiatric diagnoses, such as conversion disorder and somatisation disorder, Thomas [47] remarks that: “the DSM definitions of conversion/somatization do not provide anything resembling an operational definition for either one. Without this kind of operational definition, there can be no research capable of establishing causal relationships.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

At the borders of medical reasoning: aetiological and ontological challenges of medically unexplained symptoms

Eriksen

Kerry

Mumford

et al. 2013

Philos Ethics Humanit Med

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Medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) remain recalcitrant to the medical profession, proving less suitable for homogenic treatment with respect to their aetiology, taxonomy and diagnosis. While the majority of existing medical research methods are designed for large scale population data and sufficiently homogenous groups, MUS are characterised by their heterogenic and complex nature. As a result, MUS seem to resist medical scrutiny in a way that other conditions do not. This paper approaches the problem of MUS from a philosophical point of view. The aim is to first consider the epistemological problem of MUS in a wider ontological and phenomenological context, particularly in relation to causation. Second, the paper links current medical practice to certain ontological assumptions. Finally, the outlines of an alternative ontology of causation are offered which place characteristic features of MUS, such as genuine complexity, context-sensitivity, holism and medical uniqueness at the centre of any causal set-up, and not only for MUS. This alternative ontology provides a framework in which to better understand complex medical conditions in relation to both their nature and their associated research activity.

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Are your patient’s medically unexplained symptoms really “all in her head”?

Cited by 2 publications

References 12 publications

Evolution, forensic implications, and future of somatic symptom disorders.

Evolution, forensic implications, and future of somatic symptom disorders.

At the borders of medical reasoning: aetiological and ontological challenges of medically unexplained symptoms

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