Argument Evaluation in the Context of Assurance Case Confidence Modeling

Grigorova, Silviya; Maibaum, Tom

doi:10.1109/issrew.2014.87

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The chosen evidences are always questionable, regardless of how they are established or how much confidence we have in them. There are several approaches to justifying confidence, such as eliminative induction [19], quantitative estimation [22], provided as claims in the assurance case [20]. Wassyng et al [43,42] propose an Assurance Case Template used in the development of critical systems and their certification within a domain model.…”

Section: Certification and Conformancementioning

confidence: 99%

Standard Conformance-by-Construction with Event-B

Mendil

Aït‐Ameur

Singh

et al. 2021

Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Checking the conformance of a system design to a standard is a central activity in the system engineering life cycle, a fortiori when the concerned system is deemed critical. Standard conformance checking entails ensuring that a system or a model of a system faithfully meets the requirements of a specification of a standard improving the robustness and trustworthiness of the system model. In this paper, we present a formal framework based on the correct-by-construction Event-B method and related theories for formally checking the conformance of a formal system model to a formalised standard specification by construction. This framework facilitates the formalization of standard concepts and rules as an ontology, as well as the formalization of an engineering domain, using an Event-B theory consisting of data types and a collection of operators and properties. Conformance checking is accomplished by annotating the system model with typing conditions. We address an industrial case study borrowed from the aircraft cockpit engineering domain to demonstrate the feasibility and strengths of our approach. The ARINC 661 standard is formalised as an Event-B theory. This theory formally models and annotates the safety-critical real-world application of a weather radar system for certification purposes.

show abstract

Section: Certification and Conformancementioning

confidence: 99%

Standard Conformance-by-Construction with Event-B

Mendil

Aït‐Ameur

Singh

et al. 2021

Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…[25] introduces the notion of confidence maps as an explicit way of reasoning about sources of doubt in an argument, and proposes justifying confidence in assurance arguments through eliminative induction (i.e., an argument by eliminating sources of doubt). [29] highlights the need to model both evidential and argumentation uncertainties when evaluating assurance arguments, and considers applications of the formally evaluatable extension of Toulmin's argument style proposed by [56]. [11] details VAA -a method for assessing assurance arguments based on Dempster-Shafer theory.…”

Section: Formality In Assurance Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Software Assurance in an Uncertain World

Chećhik

Salay

Viger

et al. 2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

From financial services platforms to social networks to vehicle control, software has come to mediate many activities of daily life. Governing bodies and standards organizations have responded to this trend by creating regulations and standards to address issues such as safety, security and privacy. In this environment, the compliance of software development to standards and regulations has emerged as a key requirement. Compliance claims and arguments are often captured in assurance cases, with linked evidence of compliance. Evidence can come from testcases, verification proofs, human judgment, or a combination of these. That is, experts try to build (safety-critical) systems carefully according to well justified methods and articulate these justifications in an assurance case that is ultimately judged by a human. Yet software is deeply rooted in uncertainty; most complex open-world functionality (e.g., perception of the state of the world by a self-driving vehicle), is either not completely specifiable or it is not cost-effective to do so; software systems are often to be placed into uncertain environments, and there can be uncertainties that need to be We argue that the role of assurance cases is to be the grand unifier for software development, focusing on capturing and managing uncertainty. We discuss three approaches for arguing about safety and security of software under uncertainty, in the absence of fully sound and complete methods: assurance argument rigor, semantic evidence composition and applicability to new kinds of systems, specifically those relying on ML.

show abstract

“…Grigorova and Maibaum [16] explore further the classification of defeaters applicable to Toulmin's model. They use the classification developed by Verheij [28] as part of the attempt to formalise Toulmin's argument model.…”

Section: Fig 1 Toulmin Argument Example With Mapping To Defeatersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They use the classification developed by Verheij [28] as part of the attempt to formalise Toulmin's argument model. As the result five types of defeaters have been listed [16]: − Providing arguments against the evidence (D1); − Providing arguments directly against the claim, usually counterevidence (D2); − Attacking the validity of the inference rule (D3); − Attacking the connection between premises and the conclusion usually caused by misuse of the inference rule, when the premises are true and the reference rule is valid, but their combined use does not justify the claim (D4); − Attacking the applicability of the inference rule (D5);…”

Section: Fig 1 Toulmin Argument Example With Mapping To Defeatersmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Integrating Confidence and Assurance Arguments

Jarzbowicz

Wardziński

2015

10th IET System Safety and Cyber-Security Conference 2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To be considered compelling an assurance case should address its potential deficits, possibly with the use of a confidence argument. Assurance argument and confidence argument should be clearly separated and consistent at the same time. We propose a way of their integration with the use of an element representing rationale for each argumentation strategy. The rationale integrates confidence argument for a given argumentation step and can be used to demonstrate strength of the argument. The approach is illustrated with a confidence argument development case study. The confidence argument has been created for defeaters identified with the use of a checklist.

show abstract

Argument Evaluation in the Context of Assurance Case Confidence Modeling

Cited by 5 publications

References 7 publications

Standard Conformance-by-Construction with Event-B

Standard Conformance-by-Construction with Event-B

Software Assurance in an Uncertain World

Integrating Confidence and Assurance Arguments

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About