Argumentative Discussion: The Rationality of What?

Abstract

Most dialectical models view argumentation as a process of critically testing a standpoint. Further, they assume that what we critically test can be analytically reduced to (1) individual and (2) bi-polar standpoints. I argue that these two assumptions lead to the dominant view of dialectics as a bi-partisan argumentative discussion in which the yes-side (proponent) argues against the doubter or the no-side (opponent). I scrutinise this binary orientation in understanding argumentation by drawing on the main tenets of normative pragmatic and pragma-dialectical theories of argumentation. I develop my argument by showing how argumentative practice challenges these assumptions. I then lay out theoretical reasons for this challenge. This paves the way for an enhanced conceptualisation of dialectical models and their standards of rationality in terms of multi-party discussions, or argumentative polylogues.

Conclusions of Practical Argument: A Speech Act Analysis

“…8 One main consequence of it is a shift of focus away from the internal propositional attitude of intention to some externalised and collective speech act, notably, that of proposal. 9 Accordingly, the analyses of proposals have attracted some attention-especially in argumentation theory 8 See (Lewiński 2017;2019), (Corredor 2020), (Dascal 2005), (Green 2017), and (Walton 2006;. While some authors claim that this connection is a sign that "Aristotle has confused the psychological process by which a person comes to resolve a practical problem with the logical argument in which the steps leading to the resolution are formally set out" (Gauthier 1963, 26;cf.…”

“…While some authors claim that this connection is a sign that "Aristotle has confused the psychological process by which a person comes to resolve a practical problem with the logical argument in which the steps leading to the resolution are formally set out" (Gauthier 1963, 26;cf. Chang, 2016), others argue this might have been a deliberate choice in Aristotle's conception, where the process of deliberation is constitutive of practical reason, and thus in-principle social and open to the back-and-forth of argumentation (Lewiński 2017;2019;Dascal 2005). 9 Notice, though, that Broome, somewhat inconsistently, also speaks of speech acts which the reasoner performs to herself: "the speech-act you perform is the act of expressing an attitude of yours" (Broome 2013, 253).…”

Shale gas debate in Europe: Pro-and-con dialectics and argumentative polylogues

“…or dichotomous alternative questions with two contradictory alternatives ('Shall we frack or not?') (see Lewiński, 2015). Of course, questions over fracking can easily be posed as multiple-choice alternatives ('Shall we frack, burn more coal or run wind turbines?')…”

“…The term polylogue has been used by discourse and conversation analysts, literary scholars, logicians and philosophers (see Chen, 2010;Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2004;Sylvan, 1985) to designate any form of interaction, or dialogue, that involves more than only two participants. In argumentation theory, polylogue can be understood as a discussion where more than two opposing positions are discussed (Lewiński, 2014(Lewiński, , 2015. A supporter of a given position -whether an individual arguer or a collective of arguers -is a distinct party to a debate.…”