Aristotle'sDe Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

A new perspective of Aristotle’s theory of vision: analysis of the “psycho-physical” intertwined mechanism of vision

“…Animal’s soul has multiple functions, and vision is one of the most crucial functions. For this reason, in Johnston’s view, we should shed light on the soul “in terms of its powers” ( Johnston, 2011 ). The resulting issues are as follows: can Aristotle’s visual theory be revitalized?…”

Living without a Soul: Why God and the Heavenly Movers Fall Outside of Aristotle’s Psychology

“…Then in 2.2, we get a characterization that more fully reveals the soul and how it brings about life: it is "that by which primarily we live and perceive and think" and is "the principle of the previously mentioned activities and is determined by them, by the powers of nutrition, perception, thought and motion (DA 2.2 414a12-13; 413b11-13); cf. Johnston (2011);Frey (2015). 20 We can give a general definition of figure-Euclid offers "that which is contained by any boundary or boundaries" (Elements I, Def.…”

“…21 Ward (1996) brings out some of the interpretive issues with this analogy and rightly emphasizes the importance of this passage for Aristotle's discussion of soul, though I disagree with her ultimate interpretation. 24 Various interpretations of this analogy are given by Ward (1996), Menn (2002), Johnson (2005), Polansky (2007), Leunissen (2010), Johnston (2011), Johansen (2012, and Frey (2015). 25 Recent interpretations of ontological dependence include Fine (1984), Corkum (2008), and Peramatzis (2011).…”