Aristotle’s second problem about a science of being qua being

Abstract

There is a variety of interpretations of how, in Metaphysics Gamma 2, Aristotle argues for the possibility of a science of the essence of being-of what being is; of being qua being-and does so, famously, by introducing the claim that this kind, being, exhibits a πρὸς ἕν structure; that is, the claim that the different kinds of being are essentially dependent on a single kind that is primary. It appears that the several interpretations come in three main varieties. First, there are those who, following Owen's classic article of 1960, argue that Aristotle's primary aim is to obviate the danger that the term 'being' is simply ambiguous, in the way in which the word 'bank' is in English and the word κάλυξ in Greek. 1 This, these critics think, is a real danger due to Aristotle's theory of categories, understood as the view that there are different ultimate kinds of being which do not fall under a single genus and which, for all that theory tells us, may or may not be essentially related. For it is obvious that if 'being' is ambiguous in this way, then there cannot be a science of the essence of being. Secondly, some critics, challenging Owen's view that the theory of categories represents such a danger and arguing that the πρὸς ἕν structure is present already in that theory, argue that Aristotle's aim, rather, is to show that the possibility of a science of a subject-matter does not require that the different kinds of the subject must belong to a single genus (the so-called καθ' ἕν structure) but is likewise provided for by a πρὸς ἕν structure. According to these critics, the need to show this is due to Aristotle's, in the Posterior Analytics, having accounted for the unity of a science entirely in terms of the strict genus-species relation (καθ' ἕν structure); so that his aim in the Metaphysics is, in effect, to relax the Posterior Analytics' requirements for the unity of a science. 2 Thirdly, other critics argue that the πρὸς ἕν structure, invoked for the purpose of unifying a science, is present already in the Posterior Analytics, and that the aim of the Metaphysics is to extend this mode of unification of a science from the special sciences to the general science of being. 3 Our question in the present paper is this: Does Aristotle, in Metaphysics Gamma 2, think that the claim that being exhibits a category-based πρὸς ἕν structure is also sufficient to defend the possibility of a science of being qua being, or does he think that it is only necessary? 4 We