Armed conflict and post-conflict justice, 1946–2006

Abstract

This article introduces a new dataset on post-conflict justice (PCJ) that provides an overview of if, where, and how post-conflict countries address the wrongdoings committed in association with previous armed conflict. Motivated by the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding, we study justice processes during post-conflict transitions. We examine: which countries choose to implement PCJ; where PCJ is implemented; and which measures are taken in post-conflict societies to address past abuse. Featuring justice and accountability processes, our dataset focuses solely on possible options to address wrongdoings that are implemented following and relating to a given armed conflict. These data allow scholars to address hypotheses regarding justice following war and the effect that these institutions have on transitions to peace. This new dataset includes all extrasystemic, internationalized internal, and internal armed conflicts from 1946 to 2006, with at least 25 annual battle-related deaths as coded by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The post-conflict justice (PCJ) efforts included are: trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, purges, and exiles. By building upon the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, scholars interested in PCJ can include variables regarding the nature of the conflict itself to test how PCJ arrangements work in different environments in order to better address the relationships between justice, truth, and peace in the post-conflict period.

Civil War Victory and the Onset of Genocide and Politicide

“…For example, the postconflict period is one in which victims want retribution for crimes committed against them (Sa'adah 2006) and where victors want to punish those who caused them losses. However, when there is not a clear victor, the government is likely to take more restrained policies, such as granting amnesties to their enemies, rather than ordering the exiles or trials of their foes, as they must be careful to maintain peace and not draw the country back into a war they have just been able to end (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates, and Elster 2012). Given the conflicting pressures of the government needing to stabilize the regime and having to avoid antagonizing the opposition, postconflict periods in which there is no clear victor are those that make it (1) harder for the government to pursue policies that benefit its regime and (2) more likely to see a reoccurrence of civil wars, as the parties cannot overcome the security dilemma (Posen 1993).…”

“…5 The UCDP/PRIO data set identifies armed conflict as an incompatibility between a state and one or more nonstate actors in which at least 25 battle deaths occur in a given year (see Themnér and Wallensteen 2013). For comparability to past studies, I then follow the direction of Binningsbø et al (2012), Hartzell et al (2001), andLicklider (1995) in defining the postconflict period as the first five years following the end of civil war, as coded by the UCDP/PRIO data set, since this period is the time in which violence is most likely to reoccur. 6 Constructing the data set in this manner produces 261 observations of postconflict periods following each civil war in the time period covered by the UCDP/PRIO data.…”

Truth, justice, and reconciliation on the ground: normative divergence in the Western Balkans

“…This institutionalisation of transitional justice has strongly encouraged states to accept transitional justice as a norm or standard practice after conflict (Vinjamuri and Boesenecker 2007;Binningsbo et al 2012). Debating appropriate transitional justice mechanisms has become routine practice in conflict resolution and peacekeeping negotiations.…”

Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements

“…This finding contrasts with Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster's observation that most amnesties are unconditional.Table 9illustrates the prevalence of unconditional amnesties by context. Similar toBinningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster (2012), it finds that unconditional amnesties are more likely as a peace process becomes established, with 56 per cent amnesties resulting from peace agreements being unconditional and 61 per cent of post-agreement amnesties having no conditions attached.…”

“…For example, rather than examining the different conditions that can be attached to amnesties, some existing studies code an amnesty as simply conditional or unconditional (see e.g. Loyle and Binningsbø, 2016;Daniels, 2016;Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster, 2012).…”