Armenian Civil Society

Understanding diversity of South Caucasus civil society

“…This led to oversimplification of the complex concept: civil society was substituted with NGOs. Thanks to generous donor funding and training programmes, the number of NGOs in the three countries initially grew rapidly, plateauing at about 3,000 NGOs in Armenia (Paturyan & Gevorgyan, 2021) and Azerbaijan (Abbasov, 2010) and about 5,000 NGOs in Georgia (Companjen, 2010;Wheatley, 2010). Only a fraction of those are active today.…”

“…Only a fraction of those are active today. Most organizations function only when they have grants, many close after implementing one funded project or after failing to attract funding (Aliyev, 2015;Nodia, 2005;Paturyan & Gevorgyan, 2021). NGO-ization was most pronounced in Georgia.…”

“…Although many civic initiatives present themselves to the public as non-political, in their internal discussions they touch upon quintessentially political issues of citizenship and state accountability, often challenging neo-liberal donor narratives (Ishkanian, 2015). While in Georgia most of civil society discourse and research is focused on NGOs, in Armenia civic initiatives are by now understood as equally important civil society actors (Paturyan, 2015).…”

After the Revolution: State, Civil Society, and Democratization in Armenia and Georgia

“…Around the end of the Soviet era and during the first years of independence, civil society consisted mostly of informal movements and organizations focused on national issues related to the Nagorno Karabakh movement 7 and Armenian independence. Humanitarian relief efforts focused on survivors of the 1988 earthquake and on refugees arriving from Azerbaijan as the Nagorno Karabakh conflict escalated (Paturyan and Gevorgyan 2021). Like its Georgian counterpart, the Armenian Apostolic Church commanded deep respect and loyalty of most Armenians.…”

“…Compared to Georgia, Armenian civil society on the verge of the Velvet Revolution was more rooted in the general public, less dependent on foreign funding, and more in sync with the concerns and daily experiences of the Armenian people. To the extent of its moderate capacities, it functioned as a watchdog of the state, but it also distanced itself from the political opposition (Zolyan, 2020;Paturyan and Gevorgyan, 2021). Until April 2018, Pashinyan did not have any visible support from CSOs and activists, except for his own small team of young, but largely unknown, people.…”