Arms for education? External support and rebel social services

Abstract

How does foreign support for rebel groups affect rebel governance of civilians during armed conflict? Existing studies primarily examine the local and domestic politics of rebel rule, leaving the effects of foreign intervention on rebel governance underexplored. Focusing on rebel provision of social services, this study considers two competing arguments. The first suggests that foreign sponsorship reduces rebels’ need to rely on local civilians for resources and hence decreases rebels’ incentives to provide services. The second anticipates that by augmenting rebels’ resources and military capabilities, foreign support increases their capacity to provide welfare services. These competing logics suggest that different types of foreign support have divergent effects on rebel social service provision. The article tests this theory using cross-sectional time-series data on external support for rebel groups and rebel governance for the post-1945 period. It finds that rebel groups that receive external funding, weapons or training are significantly more likely to provide education and health services to civilians. In contrast, direct military intervention to assist insurgent forces has no effect on rebel service provision. This article is among the first to systematically study the impact of external support and third-party intervention on rebel social service provision during civil war and holds implications for civilian welfare in contested territories.

Committed sponsors: external support overtness and civilian targeting in civil wars

“…Although overtness is expectedly associated with the provision of more and higher quality resources than covertness (Carson, 2020), it is statistically associated with less violence toward non-combatants. These results corroborate recent findings from Huang and Sullivan (2020) that associate rebel sponsorship with the development of mutually beneficial relationships between insurgents and civilians.…”

“…Qualifying existing arguments (Salehyan et al, 2014; Weinstein, 2006), the findings show that insurgent capabilities do not fully explain variations in violence toward civilians. These results corroborate recent findings that associate rebel sponsorship with the development of mutually beneficial insurgent–civilian relationships (Huang and Sullivan, 2020). While a significant strand of research assumes frequent moral hazards in the sponsor–rebel relationship (Popovic, 2017; Salehyan, 2010), the findings also suggest that sponsors have leeway in dealing with rebel violence.…”

“…Grant and Kaussler (2020: 19) find that support to Syrian rebels in the 2012–2016 battle of Aleppo “had almost no impact on the level of victimization of civilians” by rebels. Finally, Huang and Sullivan (2020) find that sponsorship is positively associated with the extent to which insurgents provide social services to non-combatants.…”

“…Some articles have found no significant links between support and coercive insurgent–civilian interactions (Fortna et al, 2018; Grant and Kaussler, 2020). Another article has found that sponsorship can promote constructive rebel–non-combatant relationships (Huang and Sullivan, 2020). These contradicting findings thus call for further disaggregation of different forms of external interventions in civil conflicts.…”

Wartime governance and state-building trajectories in post-conflict societies

“…The forms, strength, and duration of wartime governance are, in turn, shaped by several factors including the strength and nature of pre-existing institutions in the communities where armed groups arrive (Arjona 2016), the levels of competition between different political actors (Kalyvas 2006), the time horizons of different factions and how long the group expects to stay in a certain area (Arjona 2016; Sanchez de la Sierra 2020), and the sources of external financing available to the group (Huang and Sullivan 2021;Snyder and Bhavani 2005;Weinstein 2006). The decisions of armed groups to establish order and exercise governance are shaped not only by competition between key political actors and external relations but also by the choices, perceptions, behaviour, and motivations of civilians living in conflict areas (Balcells and Justino 2014;Barter 2012;Justino et al 2013b;Nordstrom 1997;Revkin 2021;Verwimp et al 2019) and their ability to coordinate and exercise collective action (Arjona 2016;Breslawski 2021;Kaplan 2017;Rubin 2019).…”