Arms Racing, Military Build-Ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020

Abstract

Arms races are linked in the public conscience to potential violence. Following gas discoveries in eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey nearly came to blows in August 2020 and both states have enacted military expansion plans, further risking escalation. We present a novel approach to study the effect of military build-ups on dispute intensity, using monthly data on Turkish incursions into Greek-claimed airspace. Because airspace claims feature strongly in the dispute, these contestations represent an appropriate measure of the intensity with which Turkey pursues the conflict. Theoretically, we suggest that bilateral factors drive this intensity. We argue that increased Greek military capabilities deter incursions whereas increased Turkish military capabilities fuel them. Results from time-series models support the second expectation. Consequently, the study provides a novel methodological approach to studying interstate conflict intensity and shines new light on escalation dynamics in the Greek-Turkish dispute.

The Greek-Turkish Rivalry: A Bayesian VAR Approach

“…The Greek-Turkish relationship is about bitter historical memories, blood spilled, refugee drama, forced population exchanges, conflicting national narratives, and, among certain constituencies, racist representation of each other. But it is equally so about geopolitical competition, security anxieties, and competing sovereignty claims (Choulis et al 2021). The enduring confrontation between these two neighboring countries has led a number of researchers to test for the existence of an arms race between them, but previous studies have given mixed results.…”

“…11 NATO Defense Ministers agreed to commit a minimum of 2% of their GDP to defense spending to continue to ensure the Alliance's military readiness. This guideline also serves as an indicator of a country's 3.28% of GDP on its military sector, while Greece 3.77%, a proportion higher than the NATO average (Choulis et al 2021). The bottom left graph is, lastly, indicative of Greece's effort to respond to the military capabilities of its adversary by enhancing the capital intensity of its armed forces, which in principle, offsets its quantitative disadvantage resulting from its size and population constraints.…”

“…The results of the dynamic IRFs analysis between the rivals are barely modified. Lastly, we account for the serious Greek -Turkish disputes and include a variable, taking a value of 1 for the years 1963, 1974, 1977, 1987, 1994, 1996, 1999and 2018(Clogg 1991Brauer 2002;Tütüncü and Şahi ngöz 2020;Choulis et al 2021), but additionally, we take into consideration the significance of each state's internal security environment. Given the dramatic changes in the Balkan region and the tensions that had developed between Greece and two of its northern neighbors, Albania and North Macedonia (Klok 2003), a dummy is inserted in the models taking the value of 1 for the years 1991-1995, allowing for the Balkan area developments.…”

Essays on defense economics

“…Their relationship is about bitter history memories, blood spilled, refugee drama, forced population exchanges, conflicting national narratives and, among certain constituencies, racist representation of each other. But it is equally so about geopolitical competition, security anxieties, and competing sovereignty claims (Choulis et al 2021). The enduring confrontation between these two neighboring states has led a number of researchers to test for the existence of an arms race between them, but studies have given mixed results, rendering the subject open to further deliberation.…”

“…The results of the dynamic IRFs analysis between the rivals are barely modified. Lastly, we account for the serious Greek -Turkish disputes and include a variable, taking a value of 1 for the years 1963, 1974, 1987, 1994, 1996, 1999-2020(Clogg 1991Brauer 2002;Tütüncü and Şahi̇ngöz 2020;Choulis et al 2021), but additionally, take into consideration the significance of each state's internal security environment. Given the dramatic changes in the Balkan region and the tensions that had been developed between Greece and two of its northern neighbors, Albania and North Macedonia (Klok 2003), a dummy is inserted in the models taking the value of 1 for the years 1991-1995, allowing for the Balkan area developments.…”