Army Fires Capabilities for 2025 and Beyond

Gordon, John; Mikolic-Torreira, Igor; Barnett, D.; Best, Katharina Ley; Boston, Scott; Madden, Dan; Tarraf, Danielle C.; Willcox, J S

doi:10.7249/rr2124

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…While "the concept of deterrence has been somewhat neglected in the nearly two decades since the end of the Cold War, particularly after the attacks of September 11, 2001" (Long, 2008, United States and European pundits and governmental officers now consider conventional deterrence as one of the main features of the 21st century's international security landscape (Wilner & Wenger, 2021;Paul 2009;Wilkinson, 2020;Tripp, 2020). Actually, they were shaken by Russia's successful military operations in Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine, as well as the perception that Iran and China could also accomplish successful lightning acts of aggression (Gallagher, 2019;Gordon et al 2020;Freedman, 2014;Aust, 2018). Grudgingly, theyacknowledge that the technological superiority of Western armed forces are not enough to provide a credible and committed deterrent capacity because that advantage is shrinking and their rivals never deviated from their mission of improving the employment of their conventional forces as the "lender of last resource" of coercion (Gormley, 2008;Ochmanek, 2014;Ajili & Rouhi, 2019;Rogovoy & Giles, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Military Power and Conventional Deterrence

Dall'Agnol

Duarte²

2022

Rev. relac. int. estrateg . segur .

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This literature review explains how strategies of deterrence and compellence relate to military power. Such an inquiry is relevant as much of the literature on military power diffusion focuses exclusively on military platforms and weapons systems. Hence, we advance a more political and strategic approach rather than a more technological approach while assessing military power. The article uses “costs” and “probability of success” to assess conventional deterrence. Although both compellence and deterrence are coercive strategies, they have different implications for the diffusion of military power, especially because of the costs associated with each one. We argue that countries should not replicate or pursue a carbon copy of all the top platforms and advanced weapons systems of a leading state to catch up or to deny the advantages of technological innovation. Hence, denial strategies are much cheaper than control strategies. Finally, denial strategies often result in a decrease in the probability of success in the battlefield of an expeditionary force offensive. The review concludes that military power should relate much more to deterrence than compellence, countering the conventional Dahl’s notion that power is the ability of “A” to cause “B” to do something that “B” otherwise would not do. In other words, military power must be seen as “A” convincing “B” not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits to “B” do not justify the potential costs and risks.

show abstract