Art “En Abyme„

Kowzan, Tadeusz; Mankin, Paul A.

doi:10.1177/039219217602409604

Cited by 18 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…For at undersøge publikums perception benytter jeg mig af begrebet mise en abyme som Tadeusz Kowzan har beskrevet i artiklen "Abyme: Art "En Abyme"" (Kunst i afgrunden) (Kowzan, Tadeusz 1976). Begrebet gør det muligt at beskrive, hvordan et kunstvaerk kan bestå af forskellige virkelighedsplaner og niveauer.…”

Section: Vaerkets Afgrundunclassified

Gefangen in der Realität?

Roesen¹

2021

Peripeti

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Under en af opførelserne af min iscenesættelse af Johann Strauss’ og Karl Hafners Die Fledermaus(1874) i Graz 2011 1 varder en kvinde fra publikum, som fik et angstanfald midt under forestillingen. Hun forlod derfor med det samme rummet,alt imens forestillingen spillede videre. En sådan publikumsreaktion er ikke i sig selv bemærkelsesværdig og sådanne afbrydelser forekommer, når der er tale om livebegivenheder, hvor publikum beinder sig i samme tid og rum som aktørerne. Der er altid en vis uforudsigelighed i et forestillingsrum.

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Section: Vaerkets Afgrundunclassified

Gefangen in der Realität?

Roesen¹

2021

Peripeti

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Art and Intention

Livingston¹

2005

199

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In aesthetics, the topic of intentions comes up most often in the perennial debate between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists over standards of interpretation. The underlying assumptions about the nature and functions of intentions are, however, rarely explicitly developed, even though divergent and at times tendentious premises are often relied upon in this controversy. Livingston provides a survey of contentions about the nature and status of intentions and intentionalist psychology more generally, arguing for an account that recognizes the multiple functions fulfilled by intentions in the lives of temporally situated agents who deliberate over what to do, settle on ends and means, and try to realize some of their plans. Artists’ intentions are the same sorts of attitudes that we attribute to ourselves and to others as we attempt to describe, explain, and predict our actions. As such, intentions are relevant not only to debates over the interpretation of works of art but also to a range of other basic topics in the philosophy of art, including artistic creation and authorship, the ontology of art, the nature of texts, works, versions, and life-works, and the status and nature of fiction and fictional truth. With regard to the controversy over the interpretation of art, Livingston advocates a ‘partial’ intentionalism. Intentions are never infallible, so there is a conceptual gap between the completed work and the intentions that initiated and guided its making. Yet in spite of the fallibility of intentions and of our beliefs and claims about them, intentions regularly contribute to the determination of a work’s features, including implicit meanings, the recognition of which requires the uptake of the artist’s intentional design. Partial intentionalism also finds support in the idea that at least one sort of artistic value depends on the artist’s skilful accomplishment of intentions.

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2005

Art and Intention

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Art “En Abyme„

Cited by 18 publications

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Gefangen in der Realität?

Gefangen in der Realität?

Art and Intention

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