Articulate forgiveness and normative constraints

Warmke, Brandon

doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1101305

Cited by 14 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…These disputes are hard to resolve. On the one hand, if forgiveness requires a total and permanent loss of resentment, it could turn out that actual cases of forgiveness are comparatively rare and that forgiveness is not under our voluntary control, not something that we can decide to do nor something that we can ask for (Warmke , p. 496). On the other hand, it seems implausible that I have already forgiven the person who wronged me if I am still seething with anger towards him (Allais , p. 37).…”

Section: The Nature Of Forgivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The who, the what, and the how of forgiveness

Russell

2020

Philosophy Compass

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We are often encouraged to forgive those who have wronged us. Before we can decide whether this is what we ought to do, we had better figure out what forgiveness amounts to. This article surveys recent philosophical disagreements over the nature of forgiveness. Is it only victims who can forgive the wrongs that were done to them, or can third parties also forgive? Is it possible to forgive yourself? When you forgive, what is that you are forgiving? Do you forgive morally wrong actions, or do you forgive wrongdoers? Can you forgive things that were not actually morally wrong? How do you forgive? Do you forgive by having a change of heart towards the perpetrator, by losing your anger and resentment? Or do you forgive by changing the way you treat the wrongdoer, by withholding punishment, or by achieving reconciliation? Or do you forgive by declaring “I forgive you” to the wrongdoer?

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Section: The Nature Of Forgivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The who, the what, and the how of forgiveness

Russell

2020

Philosophy Compass

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“…Another strength of articulate views is said to lie in their capacity to acknowledge the voluntariness of forgiving; it is something we do , not something that just happens to us. Warmke (), for example, defends articulate accounts as advancing an appropriately voluntary account of forgiveness. If paradigmatic cases of forgiveness are under our voluntary control, then an account of forgiveness will need to explain forgiveness as a voluntary act.…”

Section: The Rationale For Articulatenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Articulate accounts of forgiveness seem promising because they precisely delimit the scope of forgiveness. Even those who object to the account of forgiveness Hieronymi advances, such as Kevin Zaragoza () and Brandon Warmke (), still defend the claim that accounts of forgiveness must be articulate. Other prominent writers on forgiveness, such as Pettigrove () and Holmgren (), make a point of acknowledging that their analyses meet, or fail to meet, Hieronymi's articulateness condition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inarticulate Forgiveness

O’Hagan

2019

Metaphilosophy

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Influentially, Pamela Hieronymi has argued that any account of forgiveness must be both articulate and uncompromising. It must articulate the change in judgment that results in the forgiver's loss of resentment without excusing or justifying the misdeed, and without comprising a commitment to the transgressor's responsibility, the wrongness of the action, and the transgressed person's self-worth. Non-articulate accounts of forgiveness, which rely on indirect strategies for reducing resentment (for example, reflecting on the transgressor's bad childhood), are said to fail to explain forgiveness. This paper argues that the articulateness condition is not a necessary condition for forgiveness. It responds to numerous objections advanced against non-articulate accounts, including the claim that the resentment-mitigating practices they involve amount to excusing. Appealing to P. F. Strawson's distinction between objective and participant attitudes, it argues that forgivers can take transgressors to be detrimentally causally shaped by their past while holding them to be morally responsible.

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“…So, to avoid being arbitrary, the defender of EEF must explain how forgiveness is unique amongst our ceasing-to-blame practices in being, in principle, undeserved. Brandon Warmke ( 2015 ) gives one argument for thinking that forgiveness might be a special case. If an apology or some other gesture can generate a requirement to forgive, then the wrongdoer can oblige a victim to forgive.…”

Section: Essentially Elective Forgivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But, Warmke assumes, a wrongdoer cannot oblige a victim to benefit him, and so cannot oblige a victim to forgive him. He concludes that we should accept that some gestures give reasons to forgive, but not requiring reasons ( 2015 , 505–506). However, this seems to me the wrong lesson to draw.…”

Section: Essentially Elective Forgivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Elective Forgiveness

Milam

2018

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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It is often claimed both that forgiveness is elective and that forgiveness is something that we do for reasons. However, there is a tension between these two central claims about the nature of forgiveness. If forgiving is something one does for reasons, then, at least sometimes, those reasons may generate a requirement to forgive or withhold forgiveness. While not strictly inconsistent with electivity, the idea of required forgiveness strikes some as antithetical to the spirit of the concept. They argue that forgiveness is essentially elective. In this paper, I dispute these arguments. I argue that the intuitive plausibility of the position diminishes upon reflection and that the best arguments fail to explain why reasons to forgive, unlike most other reasons for action, cannot generate requirements.

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Articulate forgiveness and normative constraints

Cited by 14 publications

References 36 publications

The who, the what, and the how of forgiveness

The who, the what, and the how of forgiveness

Inarticulate Forgiveness

Against Elective Forgiveness

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