Artificial Intelligence Measurement of Disclosure (AIMD)

Grüning, Michael

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1440255

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 110 publications

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“…Even though this method typically scores high on validity in comparison with word-count systems and computerized methods, its labor intensity severely limits our sample size (Martson & Shrives, 1991). Future studies could use more cost-effective and sophisticated mixed-method techniques to study the content of audit committee charters (e.g., Grüning, 2011). Third, the scope of this study is restricted to a subset of the largest economies by GDP, to large-cap firms and to a short period of observation, which may limit the generalizability of our findings.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Audit Committee Charter Scope: Determinants and Effects on Audit Committee Effort

2016

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In general, it is either required or recommended that listed firms adopt, periodically update and publicly disclose a written charter for their audit committee. The ostensible purpose of audit committee charters is to inform the investing public about the role and responsibilities of the audit committee of a given firm and to provide authority, direction and discipline for audit committee members. However, evidence has indicated that the audit committee charters of different firms are boilerplate copies of each other and that firms deliberately decouple actual committee practices from the content of their charters, perversely in those institutional settings characterized by a stringent disclosure regime. This paper, on the other hand, provides evidence for a significant relation between the scope of responsibilities set forth in audit committee charters of large firms and measures of actual committee activity in institutional settings characterized by stringent disclosure regimes, and an absence thereof in voluntary disclosure settings.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Audit Committee Charter Scope: Determinants and Effects on Audit Committee Effort

2016

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“…Using automated content analysis, Kothari, Li, and Short (2009) find that the management disclosures in annual reports associated with different aspects of risk (e.g., market, firm, organizational, reputational, performance or regulatory risk) exhibit predictable increases in the cost of equity capital effects for small cap stocks but inconsistent effects for large cap stocks. 5 Grüning (2011) produces an automated disclosure index rating German annual reports along several dimensions (e.g., information about markets, customers, employees, corporate governance, R&D, capital markets and corporate strategy) and shows that the index is negatively related to various information asymmetry proxies, including bid-ask spread.…”

Section: Theoretical Motivation Prior Empirical Evidence and Hypothmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The decision to include a measure of the volume of the strategic content was driven by policy moves by the FRC to encourage firms to provide narrative content to describe and explain their strategies and business model. The disclosure measures of Botosan (1997) and Grüning (2011) also seek to capture such content. The decision to include a measure of the volume of forward-looking information was driven by prior literature that shows that forward-looking information helps share prices to incorporate value-relevant (earnings) information in a timely manner (e.g., Kothari & Sloan, 1992).…”

Section: Disclosure Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Annual Report Narratives and the Cost of Equity Capital: U.K. Evidence of a U-Shaped Relation

et al. 2019

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We hypothesize and test for a U-shaped relation between the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosure in annual report narratives. Using a computer-generated word-count-based index of the level of disclosure in U.K. annual report narratives, we document a negative relation with the cost of equity capital at low levels of disclosure, and a positive relation at higher levels of disclosure, together implying the presence of an optimal level of disclosure. We interpret the positive relation at higher levels of disclosure as evidence of uninformative clutter increasing the cost of equity capital. Additional analyses indicate the presence of both firm-level learning and regulatory corporate reporting initiatives as factors shaping adjustments towards optimum levels of disclosure.

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“…Th e system in test mode demonstrated perfect reliability and a superior ability to provide consistent analysis (Grüning, 2011).…”

Section: Artifi Cial Intelligencementioning

confidence: 99%

Disruptive Technology and the Board: the Tip of the Iceberg

Evans¹

2017

EBR

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ARTICLES Agency costs of overvalued equity and earnings management in companies listed on WSE (Michał Kałdoński, Tomasz Jewartowski) Friends or foes? Activist hedge funds and other institutional investors (Andrew Carrothers) Board ethos and institutional work: developing a corporate governance identity through developing the uk code (Donald Nordberg)Governance and fi nancing of innovative very small business (VSB): evidence from a Canadian biotechnological fi rm (Alidou Ouedraogo) Corporate governance, risk and crises in small companies: shedding light from inside the boardroom black box (Leslie Spiers) Gender diversity impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and Greenhouse Gas emissions in the UK (Renata Konadu)Lessons university-based business schools should learn vicariously-rather than through experience-from university athletics (Edward W. Miles) Commercialization of the education of economists versus integrity of the university (Jan Szambelańczyk) Abstract: Th is paper reviews the disruptive technologies literature and the potential impact disruptive technologies will have in the boardroom. Changes in industries and the growth of technology are creating a new paradigm shift in industries and strategic planning within the corporate world. Disruptive technologies are changing the very fabric of our decision making and how we deliver products and services. Th e last ten years have seen exponential growth in research on disruptive technologies and their impact on industries, supply chains, resources, training, education and employment markets. Current research predicts changes in how we will conduct our daily lives and, ultimately, in the workforce of the future. Predictions are seldom totally correct as the technologies oft en move in directions we failed to anticipate. Th e debate is still open on who will be the winners and losers of future industries, but what is certain is that change has picked up pace and we are now in a new technology revolution whose impact is potentially greater than the industrial revolution. Th is paper gathers past research on disruptive technologies in order to better understand the pace and direction of change and how it will infl uence the role of boards in helping directors to adapt to manage the changing business world.

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Artificial Intelligence Measurement of Disclosure (AIMD)

Cited by 3 publications

References 110 publications

Audit Committee Charter Scope: Determinants and Effects on Audit Committee Effort

Audit Committee Charter Scope: Determinants and Effects on Audit Committee Effort

Annual Report Narratives and the Cost of Equity Capital: U.K. Evidence of a U-Shaped Relation

Disruptive Technology and the Board: the Tip of the Iceberg

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