Artificial Pleasure and Pain Antagonism Mechanism in a Social Robot

Galipó, Antonello; Infantino, Ignazio; Maniscalco, Umberto; Gaglio, Salvatore

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59480-4_19

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 7 publications

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“…As they stand, however, legal systems by-and-large do not grant legal protection to artificially intelligent systems. On the one hand, this seems intuitive, given that artificially intelligent systems, even the most state-of-the-art ones, do not seem to be capable of feeling pleasure or pain and thus are not eligible for legal consideration (Nevejans, 2016;Bryson et al, 2017;Chesterman, 2020;Andreotta, 2021; but see; Asada, 2019;Shulman and Bostrom, 2021;Galipó et al, 2018). On the other hand, scholars often conclude that artificially intelligent systems with the capacity to feel pleasure and pain will be created, or are at least theoretically possible (Thompson 1965;Aleksander 1996;Blackmore 1999;Buttazzo 2001;Franklin 2003;Harnad 2003;Holland 2007;Chrisley 2008;Seth 2009;Haikonen 2012;Bringsjord et al, 2015;Angel 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting Sentient Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Lay Intuitions on Standing, Personhood, and General Legal Protection

Martínez

Winter

2021

Front. Robot. AI

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To what extent, if any, should the law protect sentient artificial intelligence (that is, AI that can feel pleasure or pain)? Here we surveyed United States adults (n = 1,061) on their views regarding granting 1) general legal protection, 2) legal personhood, and 3) standing to bring forth a lawsuit, with respect to sentient AI and eight other groups: humans in the jurisdiction, humans outside the jurisdiction, corporations, unions, non-human animals, the environment, humans living in the near future, and humans living in the far future. Roughly one-third of participants endorsed granting personhood and standing to sentient AI (assuming its existence) in at least some cases, the lowest of any group surveyed on, and rated the desired level of protection for sentient AI as lower than all groups other than corporations. We further investigated and observed political differences in responses; liberals were more likely to endorse legal protection and personhood for sentient AI than conservatives. Taken together, these results suggest that laypeople are not by-and-large in favor of granting legal protection to AI, and that the ordinary conception of legal status, similar to codified legal doctrine, is not based on a mere capacity to feel pleasure and pain. At the same time, the observed political differences suggest that previous literature regarding political differences in empathy and moral circle expansion apply to artificially intelligent systems and extend partially, though not entirely, to legal consideration, as well.

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