Artificial wombs, birth and ‘birth’: a response to Romanis

Abstract

Recently, I argued that human subjects in artificial wombs (AWs) ‘share the same moral status as newborns’ and so, deserve the same treatment and protections as newborns. This thesis rests on two claims: (A) subjects of partial ectogenesis—those that develop in utero for at time before being transferred to AWs—are newborns and (B) subjects of complete ectogenesis—those who develop in AWs entirely—share the same moral status as newborns. In response, Elizabeth Chloe Romanis argued that the subject in an AW is ‘a unique human entity…rather than a fetus or a newborn’. She provides four lines of response to my essay. First, she argues that I have ‘misconstrued’ what birth is. Once we correct that error, it becomes clear that subjects of partial ectogenesis have not been born. Second, she argues that my claims imply that non-implanted embryos (existing in vivo) ‘would also be “born”’. But that is absurd. Third, she claims I fail to ‘meaningfully respond’ to distinctions she draws between subjects of ectogenesis and neonates. Finally, she criticises my essay for focusing on subjects of AWs rather than focusing on pregnant persons (who should be at the ‘centre’ of debates over AWs). I respond to each of these charges. In doing so, I reaffirm that (contra Romanis) some subjects of ectogenesis are newborns and all subjects of ectogenesis—even those that have not been born—share the same moral status as newborns.

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

“…Nicholas Colgrove defends the view that gestaticide is a form of infanticide. [11,12] Assuming current international standards of 'live birth' in legal and medical communities are correct, subjects of ectogestation-those that have been extracted from their mothers' bodies and placed in an AW-have literally been born. 6 [11,[13][14][15][16][17] If so, then to kill a gestateling is to kill a neonate.…”

“…[13][14][15][16][17] Subjects of partial ectogestation, therefore, have undergone the 'born-by-locationchange.' [12,18,19] The 'born-by-physiology-change' is more complicated. [21] Moreover, there are striking similarities between metamorphosis and mammalian birth; Daniel Buchholz describes how a frog metamorphosis model can help understand human perinatal development.…”

“…This view is morally dubious. 12 Reasons to reject those claims, therefore, are reasons to reject the claim that gestaticide is a 'less bad' species of infanticide. Romanis and Kingma and Finn may object: gestaticide cannot be thought of as infanticide at all because gestatelings have not been born.…”

The path toward ectogenesis: looking beyond the technical challenges

“…Finally, it can be noted that in the context of ectogenesis several authors avoid taking a stand on the moral status of the fetus, even though there is a rather wide scope of literature available on the moral status of the fetus more generally and its implications for abortion [113][114][115]. An important exception is the correspondence between Colgrove and Romanis [41,58,116,117]. Colgrove's argument holds that subjects of partial ectogenesis "are a type of newborn" (maintaining that common definitions of 'live birth' actually seem to apply to these subjects), that they share the same moral status, and thus deserve the same moral treatment as newborns.…”

“…1 While Colgrove concludes that whatever protections apply to newborns should be extended to ectogenetic subjects, there is ongoing discussion-and rightfully so-of appropriateness of definitions in this context (e.g. describing the expulsion of the fetus from the uterus to the artificial womb as 'being born' seems to disregard that emergence of that entity from the process of gestation is a crucial criterion of a definition of 'live birth' that is not completely met by such a fetal transfer) [41,58,[116][117][118]. Moreover, as explicated by Romanis, assigning a moral status does not in itself entail how entities should be treated [58].…”