ASEAN and interconnecting regional spheres: lessons for the Indian Ocean Region

Abstract

In an era of shifting global geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic power, ASEAN's resilience as a regional grouping and its relative success in keeping internal conflicts at bay through various forms of quiet diplomacy and adherence to certain norms and binding principles mean that it may become a force helping to foster peaceful and stronger regional linkages within the eastern frontiers of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In this article we focus on ASEAN's growing roles and relations within three key 'spheres' of adjoining regional-extra-regional reach, which we identify as the mostly landward Greater Mekong Sphere (GMS), the South China Sea Sphere and the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea Sphere. The Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea straddle between the Indian Ocean Region and ASEAN, so this offers a joint issue of cooperation and proximate regionalism. As for the GMS and South China Sea, the common Chinese factor holds important geo-economic and geopolitical references that IOR could incorporate into its foreign policy portfolio. Despite ASEAN's at times belowpar performances and contradictions in terms of regional and internal security, its direct and adjacent interconnectedness with the IOR suggests that it is perhaps one of the best institutions to learn from in terms of strengthening the IOR's future regionalism aspirations. ASEAN and Interconnecting Regional Spheres: Lessons for Indian Ocean Region AbstractIn an era of shifting global geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic power, ASEAN's resilience as a regional grouping and its relative success in keeping internal conflicts at bay through various forms of quiet diplomacy and adherence to certain norms and binding principles, mean that ASEAN may become a force helping to foster peaceful and stronger regional linkage within the eastern frontiers of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In this paper we focus on ASEAN's growing roles and relations within three key 'Spheres' of adjoining regional-extra-regional reach, in which we identified these as the mostly landward Greater Mekong Sphere, the South China Sea Sphere, and the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sphere. The Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea straddles between the Indian Ocean Region and ASEAN, so this offers a joint issue of cooperation and proximate regionalism. As for the GMS and South China Sea, the common Chinese factor holds important geo-economic and geopolitical references that IOR could incorporate in its foreign policy portfolio. Despite ASEAN's below par performances and contradictions in terms of regional and internal security at times, it's direct and adjacent interconnectedness with the IOR suggests it is perhaps one of the best institutions to learn from in strengthening IOR's future regionalism aspirations.

ASEAN cooperation to combat transnational crime: progress, perils, and prospects

“…Where regionalism in Southeast Asia was founded with the vision of promoting and maintaining regional security and peace after most Southeast Asian states found themselves "threatened by subversive communist movements" (Kefale, 2015) in addition to a series of territorial and border disputes. Regionalism in Southeast Asia tended to be a result of coping with complex and interrelated consequences of regional threats (Caballero-Anthony, 2010), even putting aside the idea of "former foes and strangers" (Lin and Grundy-Warr, 2012) to admit countries of Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam for the maintenance of peace and development of shared norms in the region (Kefale, 2015). More importantly, this means that "intra-ASEAN relations are still influenced by suspicion and competition" (Emmers, 2002), which essentially signaled weak or low security cooperation in ASEAN.…”