ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism

The EU's role in developing security cooperation with Myanmar at the ASEAN Regional Forum: 2004–2008

“…National considerations, however, trump conceptions of any common, stable ARF as well as ASEAN interest (Acharya 2014;Simon 1995). ASEAN members have been determined to retain their national prerogatives (Ruland 2010). At the same time, ASEAN strengthened their commitment to homogenising their policy in view of the increasing regionalism through Bali Concord II (2003), Vientiane Action Programme (2004) and the ASEAN Charter (2007) (deFlers 2010).…”

The EU-Thailand Relations : Tracing the Patterns of New Bilateralism

“…The Asian crisis produced two important lessons: first, the ASEAN countries are actually economically very vulnerable to external forces and, second, that regional responses only marginally helped further their recovery efforts at the national levels (see also Rüland 2000). The EU is expected to come to grips with its allegedly modest contribution during the crisis and more importantly with new economic challenges arising from the post-crisis economic developments in the East and Southeast Asian region.…”

“…In retrospect, the lessons from the Asian crisis underlined that while regional responses could hardly further their recovery efforts, the affected ASEAN countries have sought new bilateral solutions to heal their economic vulnerability, with not much evidence to suggest the prospect of estab-lishing a long-lasting institution regionally or internationally (see also Rüland 2000). In a sense, the 1997 Asian crisis has subsequently been regarded as an important impulse for the parties involved to re-manage their bilateral relations, e.g.…”

“…30 In the above-mentioned discussions of Burma's participation in the ASEM, for example, liberal theorists would argue that both parties are aware of the potential benefits of the business community involved and thus they have an incentive to cooperate in accommodating Burma within the ASEM process eventually. Since EU-ASEAN relations worsened considerably after the membership of Burma in ASEAN, as two subsequent meetings of the ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Committee in 1997 were cancelled and the whole ASEM process was threatened, the EU and Thailand along with other ASEAN members have made relentless efforts to solve the issues involving Burma through various institutional and representational dynamics (see also Rüland 2000;Petersson 2006). Subsequently, a compromise on Burma's low-level representation at the ASEM Summit in 2004 was reached, indicating that EU engagement managed itself to reconsider several political positions and commitments that had been made thus far (ibid.).…”

Mimicking of Integration. At the Sources of Under Utilization of Intra-ASEAN Institutions

“…The enhanced engagement in economic cooperation, so far neglected in favor of the security interests, was supposed not only to alleviate the consequences of the crisis, but also prove the member countries' commitment to the integration by partaking in some actually functioning initiatives (Narine 2008;Rüland 2000). The new blueprint was accompanied with an institutional reform, which was conducted as both widening the scope of integration by the new areas and deepening the cooperation in the already covered ones.…”